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Writing in 1513, Niccol6 Machiavelli, Second Chancellor to the Floren-
tine Republic, professed that even the most powerful leaders in the world
would one day require "the friendship of people."1 Respecting environmen-
tal regulation, his prophecy has never been truer than it is today. Adminis-
trative agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") struggle
to maintain control over rapidly growing industries. Without citizen partici-
pation, the agency lacks both the financial and human resources necessary to
enforce environmental laws. Therefore, perhaps it is not surprising that since
1970 almost every environmental statute has provided for "citizen suits" ena-
bling private entities to bring judicial actions to enjoin, and in some instances
to penalize, alleged violators of environmental regulatory requirements. But
regulators and citizen enforcers do not always agree about the proper mecha-
nism or model of environmental enforcement. In particular, citizen partici-
pation in enforcement threatens to undermine cooperative approaches to
regulatory enforcement that promise to improve the performance of environ-
mental programs. This Article explores how the federal government might
alter its mechanisms for environmental enforcement to retain the benefits
that come from citizen participation without forfeiting the efficacy that flows
from cooperative approaches to regulation.
To understand the impact of citizen participation on environmental regu-
latory enforcement, one must recognize that different types of public interest
groups bring citizen suits for different reasons.2 Some groups are controlled
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1 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 69 (George Bull trans., Penguin Classics ed. 1981)
(1513) (recognizing the potential for political dissension in a constitutional principality and con-
cluding that "it is necessary for a prince to have the friendship of the people; otherwise he has no
remedy in times of adversity").
2 For a general description of the typology of interest groups based on control and fund-
ing, and the motivations likely to attach to each type of group, see Mark Seidenfeld, Empower-
ing Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 411, 428-39 (2000).
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by individuals directly affected by regulatory violations and are motivated to
stop the resulting pollution at all costs. Others follow the dictates of their
central staffs, whose salaries may be paid out of awards from citizen suits.
Such groups may be more concerned with ancillary payments than with stop-
ping pollution. Yet other groups depend heavily on financial support from a
broad-based membership. Leaders of such a group may seek headlines that
will aid the group in attracting members and, only derivatively, in reducing
environmental risks.
Regulators, too, may have various enforcement goals. Regional EPA
offices, responsible for direct federal enforcement of environmental regula-
tions,3 are often evaluated on the number of problems they resolve or the
magnitude of the fines they collect, rather than on whether the resolution
prevents harmful pollution at reasonable cost. 4 These offices recognize that
the cooperation of regulated entities can greatly reduce enforcement costs,
which in turn will allow regulators to increase the number of violations they
address, even if they must forfeit strict compliance to induce cooperation.
They might also sacrifice strict or timely compliance for settlements that al-
low them to report that violations have been resolved. Regional offices also
work closely with state enforcement agencies, 5 and therefore may be prone
to take into account state concerns about the cost that strict compliance will
impose on companies that provide jobs and other benefits to local econo-
mies. Hence, these offices might favor enforcement approaches that help a
violator come into essential compliance with standards, even if this takes
longer or allows some regulatory technicalities to go unmet. In contrast,
agency staff members within the EPA central office who help the Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ") prosecute civil enforcement actions often join the
agency out of commitment to the environment. 6 They also interact with EPA
program offices, which write the regulations and hence tend to be committed
to their enforcement. 7 For both of these reasons, central staff members in-
volved in enforcement are apt to prefer strict compliance with regulatory re-
3 For a description of the role of the EPA's regional and central offices in enforcing regu-
latory requirements, see R.I. Van Heuvelen & Linda K. Breggin, Citizen Participation in U.S.
Environmental Enforcement, 1 PROC. INT'L CONF. ON ErrvL. ENFORCEMENT 573, 573-74
(1992).
4 See Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Improving State Environmental En-
forcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountability and Other Strategies, 33
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,559, 10,564 (2003) (explaining why EPA enforcement evalua-
tions are based on agency outputs rather than on pollution reduction).
5 See id. at 10,559; cf. Peter J. Fontaine, EPA's Multimedia Enforcement Strategy: The
Struggle to Close the Environmental Compliance Circle, 18 COLUM. J. ENvnL. L. 31, 47-48
(1993); David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State!
Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 30-61
(2000) (providing an overview of the state/EPA enforcement relationship).
6 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY Do IT 67 (1989) (noting that an agency tends to attract staff members who agree with its
mission); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environ-
mental Law, 54 LAw & CONTMP. PROBS. 311, 353 (1991) ("EPA ... employees choose to work
there primarily out of their sense of sharing in the agency's perceived mission rather than for
more tangible rewards."); see also Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 573.
7 See Fontaine, supra note 5, at 47.
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quirements. Of course, their actions are subject to oversight by political
appointees, whose relationship to the Capitol and White House may influ-
ence them to relieve significant political contributors from regulatory bur-
dens or to try to deliver benefits to various constituencies different from
those that statutes and regulation were intended to serve.
The various goals of citizen groups and regulators for resolving regula-
tory violations, therefore, often conflict. One cannot simply dismiss the goals
of either the interest groups or regulators because each is an important cog in
current environmental enforcement mechanisms. If citizen groups are per-
mitted to control enforcement, they might force compliance with the letter of
the regulation when the costs of doing so are prohibitive or extort side pay-
ments as part of settlements that benefit those who control the group but not
society as a whole. Without the discipline of potential citizen suits, however,
regulators may simply succumb to a dearth of resources or sell out to the
plaints of business, agreeing to sweetheart deals to get industry off their
backs and cases off their dockets.
This Article examines and suggests some possible approaches to recon-
cile the conflicts between the enforcement goals of regulators and citizen
groups. In examining the relationship between private citizens and modem
enforcement, it begins with a description of enforcement mechanisms, from
informal administrative responses to civil enforcement and citizen suits. 8
Next, the Article examines why modern enforcement efforts fail to achieve
universal compliance and outlines the debate on whether deterrence, cooper-
ation, or some other method of control should stand as the model for envi-
ronmental enforcement. Finally, after a review of the various roles that
private citizens play within the enforcement program, this Article explores
potential solutions to the delicate balance between flexibility and citizen in-
put in enforcement. It concludes by describing how these solutions could
operate within the currently used mechanisms of regulatory enforcement and
suggesting which solutions are most promising in the context of particular
enforcement mechanisms.
L Mechanisms of Agency Enforcement
Congress has codified a variety of enforcement mechanisms designed to
allow the EPA to reach the ultimate goal of compliance with environmental
regulation. Leaving criminal enforcement aside,9 these mechanisms fit three
8 This Article focuses primarily on enforcement actions controlled by the federal govern-
ment rather than the states. Federal environmental laws authorize state governments to imple-
ment federal environmental programs within their states; after the state program is approved as
consistent with federal requirements, the state supplants the federal government as the primary
enforcer of federal environmental law within the state. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a) (2000) (addressing state implementation plans for national primary and secondary am-
bient air quality standards); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000) (stating policy of pre-
serving and protecting the "primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution"). Experts estimate that nearly seventy percent of all enforcement actions
are state initiatives and that the vast majority of inspections are conducted by state officials. Van
Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 584 n.2.
9 The scope of this Article excludes the EPA's criminal enforcement program. Although
the EPA maintains a significant criminal enforcement program, citizen participation in the Office
2005]
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basic categories-administrative enforcement, civil enforcement, and citizen
enforcement-and range in levels of formality from informal notices of non-
compliance to lawsuits seeking penalties in federal courts.10 The EPA strives
to respond to every violation in a manner befitting the seriousness and cir-
cumstances of the violation.
As an initial matter, the EPA must decide whether to get involved in
enforcement at all. Experts estimate that states initiate nearly seventy per-
cent of all enforcement actions and that state officials conduct the vast major-
ity of inspections.1 Once a violation has been identified within a state with
an approved enforcement program, the federal government's authority and
tendency to take over enforcement is reduced. Nonetheless, the Administra-
tor of the EPA ("Administrator") may initiate an enforcement action if a
state has failed to respond to a significant concern in a timely and appropri-
ate manner. 12 She may direct enforcement when a party has violated an EPA
of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics, and Training, or in cases referred to the Department of
Justice, is extremely limited. This is consistent with our legal system's fundamental notions that:
(1) criminal enforcement involves many factors other than balancing deterrence of pollution
against the costs of compliance, such as the role of moral culpability as an element of environ-
mental crimes, and (2) citizens do not share responsibility with government for criminal prosecu-
tions. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules
and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 867 (1994); Richard J. Laza-
rus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming En-
vironmental Criminal-Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407 (1995). For purposes of this Article, it will suffice
to note that the EPA initiated 482 criminal cases in 2001; 372 defendants were charged, resulting
in almost $95 million in fines and restitution and in sentences totaling 256 years in prison. Press
Release, U.S. EPA, EPA Achieves Significant Compliance and Enforcement Progress in 2001
(Jan. 31, 2002), http://www.epa.gov/epahome/headline_020102.htm (discussing fiscal year 2001
enforcement data released by EPA headquarters).
10 In Responsive Regulation, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite argue that "compliance is
most likely when an agency displays an explicit enforcement pyramid." IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 35
(1992). Figure 2.1 provides the reader with an example of an enforcement pyramid where the
proportion of space at each layer represents the proportion of enforcement activity at that level.
Id. at 35 fig.2.1. The base of the pyramid is labeled "Persuasion." Id. This level fills a quarter of
the pyramid and therefore represents the greatest amount of enforcement activity. See id. The
next levels, in order of increasing severity and decreasing activity, include: "Warning Letter,"
"Civil Penalty," "Criminal Penalty," "License Suspension," and "License Revocation." See id.
For further explanation of the enforcement pyramid, see generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUN-
ISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY (1985) (introducing the enforcement
pyramid concept).
11 See Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 584 n.2; see also Markell, supra note 5, at
32 (reporting that "[s]tates conduct roughly ninety percent of the inspections in this country,
and, according to leading state officials, they bring approximately eighty to ninety percent of all
enforcement actions").
12 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) ("If beyond the thirtieth day after the
Administrator's notification the State has not commenced appropriate enforcement action, the
Administrator shall issue an order requiring such person to comply ... or shall bring a civil
action .... ); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) ("At any time after the expiration of 30 days
following the date on which [the Administrator notifies the State of a violation], the Administra-
tor may ... bring a civil action .... "). When a state has initiated enforcement proceedings the
EPA may be limited in pursuing its own enforcement action against the violator. See, e.g., Har-
mon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that EPA overstepped its
authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") when it overfiled
state agency's enforcement efforts against manufacturer); see also Jerry Organ, Environmental
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order or consent decree,13 and she may rely on emergency powers to take
immediate action in the face of an imminent threat to public health or wel-
fare. 14 Once the violation has been detected and a Notice of Violation
("NOV") issued, the Administrator must choose the enforcement mechanism
best suited to the severity of the violation and the unique circumstances of
the parties involved.
Whether the Administrator is obligated to act upon information that a
violation has occurred is a topic of debate fueled on one side by the language
of enforcement provisions in popular environmental laws, and on the other
by the judicial recognition of the need for prosecutorial discretion. The
Clean Water Act states that "[w]henever, on the basis of any information
available to him, the Administrator finds that any person is in violation.., he
shall issue an order requiring such person to comply.., or shall bring a civil
action. ' 15 Despite this seemingly mandatory language, several circuits have
recognized that the Administrator retains discretion to ignore the violation.
For example, in Dubois v. Thomas,16 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit applied Chevron and concluded that the Administrator's
interpretation of the enforcement provision of the Clean Water Act deserved
deference and that his duties to investigate or make findings were therefore
discretionary. 17 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
also found that the Administrator had discretion, but avoided the problem of
the mandatory language of the Act by finding that the discretion attached to
finding a violation rather than to action the Administrator could take once
she found a violation.18 Some district courts, however, have held that
Federalism Part I: The History of Overfiling Under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA Prior to
Harmon, Smithfield, and CLEAN, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,615 (2000); Jerry Organ,
Environmental Federalism Part I: The Impact of Harmon, Smithfield, and CLEAN on Overfiling
Under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,732 (2000). But see
United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that EPA had
authority to seek financial assurances, despite existence of independent state enforcement pro-
ceedings, so long as it provided notice to state environmental agency before commencing ac-
tion); United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1092 (W.D. Wis. 2001)
(holding that settlement between petroleum refinery and state did not operate as legal bar to
new prosecution by United States of refinery on same alleged environmental violations under
Clean Air Act that implicitly recognized overfiling).
13 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2) (enabling the Administrator to com-
mence a civil action "[w]henever [a person] has violated, or is in violation of... any rule, order,
waiver or permit"); United States v. Midwest Suspension & Brake, 824 F. Supp. 713, 730-31
(E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding that violation of an administrative order may result in injunctive
relief and civil penalties).
14 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) ("[Ulpon receipt of evidence that a
pollution source or combination of sources is presenting an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons where such endangerment is to the
livelihood of such persons, . . . [the Administrator] may bring suit on behalf of the United
States.").
15 Id. § 1319(a)(1) (emphasis added).
16 Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1987).
17 Id. at 948-50; see also Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488-91 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding
that the Administrator did not have a duty to issue an abatement order despite use of the word
"shall").
18 See Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d 663, 671-72 (2d Cir.
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§ 1319(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act creates a nondiscretionary duty to issue
an NOV whenever the Administrator becomes aware that a violation has
occurred. 19
A. Administrative Enforcement
After the Administrator is informed of a violation, issues an NOV, noti-
fies the state, and assumes enforcement responsibility, she has discretion to
issue an administrative order or penalty.20 If the Administrator issues a com-
pliance order, the order is served on the violator, and a copy of the order is
sent immediately to the state in which the violation occurred. 21 The order
specifies the violation and need for compliance but does not take effect until
the violator has had the opportunity to meet with the Administrator.2 2 At
this point, the violator and the EPA generally negotiate a reasonable time
schedule for achieving compliance. 23 Once set, the schedule is not subject to
judicial review, 24 but the Administrator is authorized to reward good faith
efforts by extending deadlines. 25 It is this type of flexibility that encourages
cooperation between the regulated entity and the Administrator.
1982) (holding that the mandatory duty to issue notice of violations under the Clean Air Act
arises only after the Administrator makes a discretionary finding of violations).
19 See, e.g., Greene v. Costle, 577 F. Supp. 1225, 1227-30 (W.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that
issuance of a compliance order was mandatory); New Eng. Legal Found. v. Costle, 475 F. Supp.
425, 433 (D. Conn. 1979) (holding that the Clean Water Act "imposes upon the Administrator a
non-discretionary duty to issue a NOV once he finds non-compliance with [state implementation
plan] requirements"), affd, 632 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980); S.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F.
Supp. 118, 134 (D.S.C. 1978) (explaining that once a violation is reported, the Administrator
must issue a compliance order).
20 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2000). An NOV is not "final agency
action" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2000), and
therefore is not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., W. Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302,
310 (3d Cir. 1975). Issuance of compliance orders under the Clean Water Act is analogous, both
in procedure and substance, to EPA authority under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") and the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Laguna
Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir. 1995).
21 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(4)-(5) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4).
22 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4). There is no provision for public
involvement in working out the provisions of a compliance order. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(a)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4).
23 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(A) ("[The compliance schedule] is not to exceed thirty
days in the case of a violation of an interim compliance schedule.., and not to exceed a time the
Administrator determines to be reasonable in the case of a violation of a final deadline, taking
into account the seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply with applicable
requirements.").
24 See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1248-60 (11th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that a compliance order under the Clean Air Act is not reviewable because it has no inde-
pendent legal force and hence is not final agency action); Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565
(holding that the Clean Water Act precludes judicial review of compliance orders and citing
decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits with
similar holdings under both the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act). But see Allsteel, Inc. v.
U.S. EPA, 25 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that an abatement order under the Clean
Air Act, unlike a compliance order, is judicially reviewable because that Act grants judicial re-
view over "'any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the administrator"' (quoting
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added))).
25 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(B).
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Nonetheless, sometimes the EPA determines that the severity and cir-
cumstances of a violation demand something more than a compliance order.
In these cases, the Administrator, after consulting with the state in which the
violation occurred, may issue a civil penalty.26
Civil penalties are divided into two classes. Class I includes penalties
totaling less than $25,000. When the EPA imposes Class I penalties it must
notify the alleged violator in writing, and allow the alleged violator "a rea-
sonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. '27 Class I penal-
ties may not exceed $125,000 and, when imposing them, the EPA must
provide notice and a formal hearing as prescribed by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.28 The economic ramifications of Class I and Class II penalties
differ and in deciding which class of penalties to pursue the Administrator
may consider the extent and gravity of the violation, the regulated entity's
culpability and ability to pay, and the economic benefit received from the
violations.29 In addition to these factors, the Administrator will also consider
the administrative burdens posed by the class of penalty she pursues, and
both the violator and affected private citizens will have several opportunities
to influence the process.
The first opening for the public to involve itself in either a Class I or
Class II penalty action occurs when the Administrator publishes notice of her
intentions in the Federal Register and accepts comments from the public at
large.30 A second entrance opens between the end of the comment period
and the issuance of the order. If the penalty falls under Class I, for which the
agency need not provide a formal hearing, any person who commented on
the proposed penalty may petition the Administrator to set aside the order
and provide a hearing.31 For Class II penalties, which require a formal hear-
ing, any person who commented on the proposed penalty will be given rea-
sonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.32 Once the order
becomes final, the violator or any person who commented on the penalty
26 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1)(B). In fiscal year 2001, the EPA issued 3228 administrative or-
ders and field citations, resulting in over $23 million dollars in administrative fines. Press Re-
lease, supra note 9.
27 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A).
28 See id. § 1319(g)(2)(B) (calling for an "opportunity for a hearing on the record in accor-
dance with section 554 of Title 5"). The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of
1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note (2000), mandates that EPA adjust its civil monetary penalties for
inflation every four years. Because of such adjustments, currently the EPA can issue a Class I
civil penalty up to $11,000 per violation or a maximum penalty of $27,500, and a Class II penalty
up to $11,000 for each day on which the violation occurred or a maximum penalty of $137,500.
Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Inflation, 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (1999).
29 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (listing factors that may be considered in determining the
amount of a penalty).
30 Id. § 1319(g)(4)(A) ("Before issuing an order assessing a civil penalty.. . the Adminis-
trator.., shall provide public notice of and reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed
issuance of such order.").
31 Id. § 1319(g)(4)(C). The request to set aside the order must take place within thirty
days after the issuance of the order. See id. If the evidence presented in this petition is material
to the violation and was not originally considered, the Administrator may set aside the order, but
this is a rare occurrence. More often, the Administrator denies the hearing and publishes the
reasons for the denial in the Federal Register. See id.
32 Id.
20051
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may seek judicial review.33 But a federal court will not set aside civil penal-
ties assessed by an agency "unless there is not substantial evidence in the
record, taken as a whole, to support the finding of a violation or unless the
Administrator's ... assessment of the penalty constitutes an abuse of discre-
tion," and it will not impose additional penalties unless there is a finding of
abuse of discretion, 34 a standard that requires courts to grant significant def-
erence to agency penalty determinations.
B. Civil Suit by the Government
The second category of enforcement mechanisms, broadly labeled civil
enforcement, occurs when the Administrator decides to sue the alleged viola-
tor in federal court, rather than to pursue an administrative remedy. The
government uses such suits to combat recalcitrant violators and imminent
threats to the environment.35 The threat of a civil suit provides EPA with
added leverage as district courts have authority to grant relief beyond that
which is available in administrative enforcement, 36 including issuing a tempo-
rary or permanent injunction, assessing a civil penalty, and collecting fees
owed to the United States. 37 If the Administrator decides to initiate a civil
enforcement action, the federal government brings an action in district
court. 38 Upon notice of the Administrator's intention to prosecute, the
EPA's legal and program offices develop the case and then refer it to the
DOJ, which handles all of EPA's federal cases.39
33 Id. § 1319(g)(8) ("Any person against whom a civil penalty is assessed ... or who com-
mented on the proposed assessment of such penalty . . . may obtain review of such assess-
ment ...."). An order becomes final thirty days after its issuance unless a petition for judicial
review is filed or an interested person files a petition for a hearing. See id. § 1319(g)(5). A
notice of appeal must be filed within the thirty-day period beginning on the issue date of the civil
penalty order. See B.J. Carney Indus. Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 192 F.3d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 1999) (charac-
terizing the plaintiff's appeal of a civil penalty as untimely because it was filed more than thirty
days after the A.L.J.'s order), vacated pursuant to settlement by 200 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2000).
34 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8)(B).
35 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (2000) (authorizing the Administrator to
bring a civil action "[w]henever, on the basis of any information available to the Administrator,
the Administrator finds that any person has violated or is in violation of any requirement"). The
EPA frequently will use a compliance order to try to work out a compliance schedule and not
seek penalties unless the violator refuses to follow the compliance order. For discussion of au-
thority to issue compliance orders, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
36 In fiscal year 2001, the EPA won injunctive relief valued at $4.3 billion, and violators
paid $125 million in civil penalties, with an additional $25.5 million going to states in shared
penalties. Press Release, supra note 9.
37 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) ("[Sluch court shall have jurisdiction to re-
strain such violation and to require compliance."); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (The
district court has jurisdiction "to restrain such violation, to require compliance, to assess such
civil penalty, to collect any fees owed to the United States ... and any noncompliance assess-
ment and nonpayment penalty.").
38 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) ("Any action ...may be brought in the
district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant is located or resides or is
doing business .. "); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) ("Any action ... may be brought in
the district of the United States for the district in which the violation is alleged to have occurred,
or is occurring, or in which the defendant resides, or where the defendant's principal place of
business is located ....").
39 Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 573-74. EPA guidelines on "parallel pro-
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure determine a citizen's right to inter-
vene in a federal case. Rule 24(a) provides that anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action when a statute of the United States confers an uncon-
ditional right to intervene.40 Several environmental statutes grant interven-
tion as a matter of right.41 To satisfy either statutory requirements or
constitutional standing, intervenors must show that the violation adversely
affects them. 42 The standing requirement is not difficult to meet in cases of
ongoing violations, although it can be a significant barrier to intervention in
cases involving purely past violations.4 3 For example, in United States v. Met-
ropolitan St. Louis Sewer District," the Missouri Coalition for the Environ-
ment ("Coalition") filed a motion to intervene. 45 Reversing the trial court's
denial of the motion, the Eighth Circuit found that the environmental
group's 25,000 members may have been adversely affected because the mem-
bers "visit, cross, and frequently observe the bodies of water identified in the
United States' complaint and that from time to time these members use these
waters for recreational purposes. '46 The court did not require the Coalition
to explain, much less prove, how the pollution adversely affected its aesthetic
ceedings," where civil or administrative enforcement actions are initiated at the same time as
criminal enforcement, provide a glimpse of the DOJ-EPA balance of power:
EPA as the agency responsible for administering the statutes and regulations which
are to protect the environment and human health from undue risk, is the appropri-
ate initial determiner of when a hazard or risk exists and its degree of environmen-
tal or health significance. The DOJ decides when a matter may be judicially
brought and maintained in the Federal courts. An enforcement matter which EPA
views as appropriate ... may be rejected for legal or DOJ policy reasons; however,
the initial decision concerning requesting and referral of enforcement matters ... is
that of EPA.
Memorandum from the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, to the U.S. EPA
(June 21, 1989), http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfundpara-pro-
ceed-rpt.pdf.
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Rule 24(a) further provides that "[u]pon timely application any-
one shall be permitted to intervene in an action... when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's
ability to protect that interest." Id.
41 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (using similar language as the
Clean Air Act: "[I]f the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
civil or criminal action in a court of the United States... any citizen may intervene as a matter
of right."); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) ("[I]f the Administrator or State has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States... any person
may intervene as a matter of right.").
42 "Citizen" is defined in the Clean Water Act as "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). Even when the statute does not
limit intervention to those adversely affected, the constitutional doctrine of standing imposes
such a limit. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
43 Standing for a citizen to intervene as a party requires the same interest as for the citizen
to bring suit on her own. See, e.g., United States v. City of Toledo, 867 F. Supp. 595, 597 (N.D.
Ohio 1994). Hence, case law on standing applies to intervention as well. See id. The case law
holds that citizens generally do not have standing to bring suit based on a past violation unless
they can prove that the violation is ongoing or likely to recur. See infra note 109.
44 United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 883 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1989).
45 Id. at 55.
46 Id. at 56.
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and use interests. Construed liberally, Rule 24(a) gives a voice to local
groups and individuals who may have been silenced by the costs of litiga-
tion.47 As intervenors, these voices may alter the relationship and existing
balance of power between the EPA and its regulated entities, a balance of
power that takes on great significance in the negotiation of a settlement
agreement.
C. Settlement Agreements
Whether the parties are engaged in administrative or civil enforcement,
there is opportunity for both parties to save time and money through settle-
ment.48 In agency adjudications, parties may settle their dispute in the form
of a written document known as a consent agreement. Civil judicial proceed-
ings may result in a consent decree-a written agreement signed by all of the
parties. Both types of settlement agreements allow the parties to accept cer-
tain corrective actions, such as administrative fines or permit modifications,
without admitting guilt or innocence; a key distinction, however, is that a
consent decree, unlike a consent agreement, must be approved by the federal
judge presiding over the civil action.49 Nevertheless, "[b]ecause enforcement
involves the prioritization of agency resources, courts are loathe to get ac-
tively involved in the process." 50  Judicial review, therefore, is often
minimal.51
One of the most common and controversial features of a settlement
agreement is the Supplemental Environmental Project ("SEP").52 A SEP af-
fords violators occasion for penalty reduction, and perhaps rehabilitation of
public relations and reputation, through investment in an environmental pro-
ject unrelated to the violation.53 S.C. Johnson & Son, for example, resolved
violations of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act by
47 See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 Bu'. L. REV. 833, 866-67
(1985) (finding that local environmental groups, local citizen groups, and private individuals out-
numbered national environmental groups as intervenors nine to one). But see id. at 867 & n.85
(finding that courts are "extremely reluctant" to allow third-party intervenors to upset a settle-
ment agreement and citing United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83 (D. Alaska
1977), and United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1986)).
48 In fiscal year 2001, EPA entered 222 settlement agreements. See Press Release, supra
note 9.
49 See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001).
50 Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative Law in the Contracting State, 28 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 215, 236 (2000).
51 See discussion infra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
52 See David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits of Environmental Enforcement Reform: The
Case of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1181, 1182-83 (explaining that
the EPA "clearly... lack[s] the authority to simply order violators to undertake SEPs"); see also
Notice of Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 60 Fed. Reg.
24,856, 24,858 (May 10, 1995) ("The legal evaluation of whether a proposed SEP is within EPA's
authority and consistent with all statutory and Constitutional requirements may be a complex
task.").
53 In 2001, the EPA negotiated SEPs valued at about $89.1 million, up sixty percent from
2000's value of $55.9 million. See Press Release, supra note 9.
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agreeing to a SEP in 2001 for specialized and preventative health care in
Baltimore, Maryland. 54 The corporation purchased and staffed a Mobile
Asthma Clinic for the Asthma and Allergy Foundation of America. 55 Settle-
ment funds of nearly $700,000 supported the "Breathmobile" for one year of
diagnosis and treatment. 56 Although most would agree that SEPs promote
worthwhile causes, the reality of backroom negotiations and a lack of trans-
parency in the negotiation process makes some fearful of SEPs in general.57
The agency may have an institutional interest in getting the violator to take
action that the agency cannot directly order, and this interest can encourage
the agency to sign off on some projects that might provide insufficient deter-
rence against future violations or might not be the best means for the violator
to rectify the environmental harm it has caused.
Settlement agreements usually result from negotiations between the en-
forcement arm of the EPA and the violator, and hence can easily fall into
regulatory shadows outside the gaze of environmental interest groups. The
lack of public involvement in settlement negotiations makes them susceptible
to manipulation that can compromise the underlying purposes of the regula-
tory scheme.58 To shed light on settlement negotiation, environmental laws
require the Administrator to publish notice in the Federal Register well in
advance of any final agreement. 59 Written comments are accepted and con-
sidered and may result in a decision by the Administrator or Attorney Gen-
eral to withdraw from the agreement.60 Although citizen participation in
settlement agreements ostensibly encourages the agency to negotiate at arm's
length, the lack of meaningful judicial review can thwart efforts to open set-
tlement agreements to citizen input. At the same time, however, adding pub-
54 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. EPA, BEYOND COMPLI-
ANCE: SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 23 (2001) (describing the EPA's SEP pro-
gram and the individual SEPs entered in 2001), http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/
publications/civil/programs/sebrochure.pdf.
55 Id.
56 See Press Release, supra note 9. When the one-year commitment of the SEP is com-
pleted, the program will continue through the University of Maryland. See OFFCE OF ENFORCE-
MENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 54, at 23.
57 See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delega-
tions of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 873, 941 (arguing for greater "openness" of regulatory
negotiations as a restraint on "administrative arm-twisting" in the settlement process).
58 Cf. Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Inter-
est in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015 (2001) (addressing the principal-agent gap in
"rulemaking settlements," which are settlements of lawsuits challenging administrative rules or
final agency actions, and discussing ways to subject such settlements to more public scrutiny).
59 E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2000) (requiring notice to be published "[a]t
least 30 days before a consent order or settlement agreement of any kind ... is final or filed with
a court"). The notice requirement does not apply to settlements of civil or criminal penalties.
Id.
60 See id. Regulations issued by the DOJ mandate a thirty-day comment period before
entry of judgment on a proposed settlement in federal civil actions to enjoin discharges of pollu-
tants. See Consent Judgments in Actions to Enjoin Discharges of Pollutants, 28 C.F.R. § 50.7
(1999). The DOJ reserves its right to withdraw its consent to the proposed settlement if the
comments received indicate that the settlement is "inappropriate, improper, or inadequate." See
id.
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lic interest groups, or "PIGs," 61 to the trough, so to speak, also poses the
threat of unnecessary delay, increased expenditures, and the possibility that
the settlement process will break down entirely.
Whether citizen participation in ongoing settlement negotiations is bene-
ficial or whether citizens' comments affect the overall process is not easily
determined. As a practical matter, negotiations may span several months,
even years, and often times consist of undocumented, informal dealings. 62
Without documentation, researchers face an almost impossible task of recon-
struction because, unlike ordinary judicial opinions that provide readers with
factual histories, court approval of a consent decree is most often unpub-
lished or cursory. 63
The events leading to final settlement of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill
serve as unique documented examples of the negotiation game.64 Their uni-
queness stems less from the negotiation process than from the national atten-
tion and resulting press coverage that the process received. The
documentation of the process resulting from this attention provides useful
insights into the processes underlying less publicized settlements.
On March 23-24, 1989, the Exxon tanker Valdez spilled over eleven mil-
lion gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound after striking a reef.65
Although the spill occurred in March of 1989, the federal government, the
State of Alaska, and the Exxon Corporation (and its subsidiaries) had not yet
reached agreement as of February 15, 1991, the day that Exxon rejected the
initial proposal to settle the governments' civil claims for $1.2 billion. 66 Less
than a month later, the parties agreed to a settlement under the authority of
the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
Exxon would pay civil fines of $900 million to the United States and the State
of Alaska over an eleven-year period, with a "reopener" provision for an
additional $100 million for unforeseen injuries and restoration projects. 67
61 See Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 428 (defining public interest groups as "a group that
states as its aim the use of group resources to provide benefits to members who share a diffuse
interest in particular regulatory matters"); see also AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 10, at
56-59 (coining the acronym "PIG").
62 See Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 232 ("In many contexts ... agency procedures fail to
provide a visible process that allows those affected to make their concerns known to the agency
and ultimately to Congress.").
63 This is one indication of the judiciary's failure to provide meaningful review of settle-
ment agreements or consent decrees. See discussion infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
64 See United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A-91-082-CV (D. Alaska 1991).
65 See, e.g., Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 576.
66 See Governments, Exxon Seek Settlement on Liability for 1989 Valdez Oil Spill, 21 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1903, 1903 (Feb. 22, 1991).
67 See Settlement Agreement Concerning the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Between the United
States, the State of Alaska and the Exxon Corp., Exxon Shipping Co., and Exxon Pipeline Co.,
56 Fed. Reg. 11,636 (proposed March 19, 1991) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement]. The Settle-
ment Agreement also assigned $100 million in fines stemming from criminal charges. Exxon
Agrees to Pay up to $1.1 Billion to Settle Governments' Oil Spill Cleanup Claims, 21 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2027, 2027 (Mar. 15, 1991). Exxon agreed to the settlement on March 13. Id. Earlier
that month, negotiations had been temporarily restrained after five native Alaskan villages filed
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging their exclusion
from the closed settlement talks. Id. Judge Stanley Sporkin issued a temporary restraining order
to bar settlement until he could hear the native Alaskans' claims. Id. In their briefs and in oral
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The parties published notice of the settlement and invited comments from
the public.68
The public responded, directly and indirectly influencing the terms of
the settlement. Citizens not only submitted comments, some of which were
eventually incorporated into the final settlement, 69 but they also lobbied the
Alaskan government. 70 Under political pressure, Alaska Governor Walter J.
Hickel refused to sign off on the deal unless the Alaskan legislature approved
it.71 A total of 107 private citizens testified at House hearings: eighty-one
individuals spoke against the agreement, just three supported it, and the rest
were undecided. 72 The House rejected the deal on May 2; by May 3, Gover-
nor Hickel and Exxon formally withdrew.73 Ironically, the main concern
about the proposed settlement centered on the time schedule for payments:
the citizens wanted "more money up front, ' 74 but, by nixing the settlement,
they created the potential for even greater delays before Exxon ultimately
made any payments.
Following a wave of public criticism of the House's rejection of the set-
tlement, Alaska's governor and the federal government resumed negotiations
with Exxon, this time without strings.75 The parties reached a new agreement
including increased criminal fines and a provision for payment of $90 million
within ten days of the district court's approval of the settlement, 76 which
Judge Holland issued on October 8, 1991. 77 Barry M. Hartman, then-acting
assistant attorney general for the DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources
argument at a March 8 hearing, DOJ attorneys argued "that third parties, including the native
Alaskans, would have the right to oppose any settlement because it would take the form of a
consent decree which is open for public comment before a federal court." Id. at 2028. Unper-
suaded, Sporkin described the government's refusal to invite the native Alaskans to the bargain-
ing table as "not fair and not American." Id. As a result of the judge's reprimand, the proposed
settlement preserved the rights and obligations of Alaska native villages to act as trustees under
CERCLA. Id. at 2027.
68 Settlement Agreement, supra note 67, at 11,636 ("Comment is sought from the public
concerning the proposed Settlement Agreement. The Agreement provides that the government
can withdraw from the Settlement Agreement within 15 days of the close of the comment period
if the comments received disclose facts or considerations which show that the Agreement is
inappropriate, improper or inadequate, or if, before the end of the 15th day following the close
of the comment period, the Alaska State Legislature has not approved the Agreement as
written.").
69 See Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 576 ("For example, in response to com-
ments from one group, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, a provision was added to the
settlement which provided that funds could be used to restore archeological sites.").
70 See, e.g., Alaska House's Rejection of Settlement Spells Death for $1 Billion Exxon Pact,





75 See Exxon Agrees to Pay $1.125 Billion to Settle Litigation over Valdez Spill, 22 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1403, 1403 (Oct. 4, 1991) (noting Governor Hickel's decision not to submit this
settlement agreement to the Alaska legislature for its approval).
76 See id.
77 United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A-91-082-CV (D. Alaska 1991). Despite the great
magnitude of this settlement, Judge Holland's opinion is unpublished, and I have been unable to
get a copy for greater analysis.
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Division, touted the penalty plan as "one of the largest ... of its kind in
American history, '78 but a senior attorney for the Natural Resources De-
fense Council ("NRDC") noted that the additional payments represented"only two days of profits for [Exxon], which in the first six months of [1991]
reported $3 billion in profits. '79 While California Representative George
Miller criticized the settlement as an insufficient response to "one of the
worst environmental tragedies in this nation's history," 80 Governor Hickel
remarked on the "high. . . level of cooperation between the state and federal
governments and private parties." 81 Whether negotiations were a success is
indeed a matter of opinion.
Overall, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of citizen involvement on
the settlement process. Most observers are quick to value citizens' participa-
tion based on a bottom line-whether the final settlement agreement re-
sulted in higher financial gain for the government.82 But the size of the
settlement does not account for the intangible costs of delay and is an insuffi-
cient indicator of the intrinsic value of citizen participation. 83
For example, in the case of the Exxon Valdez spill, the State of Alaska
and the federal government have spent close to $700 million on restoration
and preservation of parks and wildlife refuges. 84 But scientists hired to moni-
tor the program "believe that it has shown little progress, that it is 'moving
toward a piece-meal, small-scale, project-driven approach,' and that it 'seems
to be losing sight of its ecosystem focus as it selects individual species for
attention."' 85 This myopic approach may be a product of interest group in-
volvement and media attention, which focused on the plight of individual
78 Exxon Agrees to Pay $1.125 Billion to Settle Litigation over Valdez Spill, supra note 75,
at 1403.
79 See id. (quoting Sarah Chasis of the Natural Resources Defense Council).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1404.
82 Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 576 (referring to the benefits of citizen com-
ments, noting that they have "yielded, on occasion, changed terms, such as an increase in the
amount of the penalties paid").
83 See, e.g., id. at 577 ("The primary disadvantage that can result from public participation
in settlements is unnecessary delays in entering final enforceable settlements in court."). In
United States v. Amoco Chemical Co., for example, citizens who lived next to the BRIO Refinery
site in Houston, Texas responded to a notice of settlement with over 100 comments, incorporat-
ing several thousand pages of documents. See id. Although the United States filed the consent
decree in August 1989, the public participation process delayed the approval of the consent de-
cree, which remained in its original form, for almost two years. See id.
84 FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 428 (2000);
see also Diane S. Calendine, Comment, Investigating the Exxon Valdez Restoration Effort: Is
Resource Acquisition Really Restoration?, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 341, 350-51 (2000)
(noting the high percentage of the settlement that went to land acquisitions, despite the fact that
sixty-eight percent of the land in Alaska was already federally owned, and that the land was
acquired at the expense of native Alaskans who had fought the federal government for decades
to gain control of the land in the early 1970s).
85 Fred Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 207, 317 (2002) (quoting COMM. TO REVIEW THE GULF OF ALASKA ECOSYS-
TEM MONITORING PROGRAM, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT 27 (2001)). Ac-
cording to Professor Bosselman, "the idea that restoration is the desirable approach may be
inconsistent with today's awareness that ecological systems are continually changing." Id. at 315.
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animals from the moment the accident occurred, creating a public relations
incentive for Exxon, and eventually the governments, to spend freely on ef-
forts to save individual otters and birds.86 One volunteer who helped to
hand-scrub oil off of these animals explained that "Exxon spent $80,000 per
otter that survived the cleaning, but at least half of those are thought to have
died soon after they were released. So it was closer to $160,000 per animal
[saved].... [Mioney would have been better spent restoring and protecting
habitat. '87 While it is unfair to claim that misuse of funds would not have
occurred without citizen intervention, the roles that citizens played in the
process undoubtedly shaped the outcome.
D. Citizen Suits
Citizen suits have contributed to the EPA's ultimate goal of increasing
compliance in the regulated community and, in many ways, have acted as
sustenance to a starving agency. Plagued with the difficult task of detec-
tion,88 a lack of resources, 89 and political constraints, 90 the EPA has, to some
extent, welcomed citizen suits to alleviate the tension created by demand for
enforcement that outstrips the agency's supply.91
Although statutes authorizing private suits to prevent environmental
harm predate public enforcement of environmental laws, 92 the Clean Air Act
incorporated the first modern civil suit provision in 1970. 93 Since then, al-
most all major environmental statutes have included citizen suit provisions
86 Id. at 316.
87 Id. at 316 n.706 (quotations omitted).
88 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 190 (discussing the difficulty and cost-prohibitiveness of accurate detection
of environmental violations). Although most state and federal laws require continuous monitor-
ing, "practicable and continuous monitors for some forms of emissions are unavailable, on-site
monitoring equipment is subject to tampering to disguise high emissions, and midnight dumping
of pollutants remains a significant problem." Id.
89 See Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 461 (noting Congress's failure to provide "sufficient
resources" for enforcement under the Clean Water Act) (citing David R. Hodas, Enforcement of
Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforce-
ment Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV.
1552, 1558-60 (1995)).
90 The level of EPA enforcement activity is heavily influenced by the political ideologies of
the president. AYRES & BRArrHWArIE, supra note 10, at 8. For example, under the Reagan
administration, environmental enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act "dropped to 27
percent of its 1977 peak. But the deregulation produced a backlash, to the point where 1984
enforcement exceeded the 1977 level by 30 percent." Id. (citations omitted).
91 But see ENVTL. LAW INST., CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES iX (1984) ("Citizen suits were meant by Con-
gress to operate independently of EPA'[s] [sic] activities and to allow citizens to set their own
priorities."); Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citi-
zen Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLrICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRI-
VATE REWARDS 105, 114-17 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (arguing that
Congress never planned on universal enforcement and that citizen suits augment the enforce-
ment program beyond Congress's intent).
92 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 88, at 195-96 (detailing an English water pollution stat-
ute enacted in 1388 under King Richard II that allowed for prosecution by any person who
"[felt] himself aggrieved" (quotations omitted)).
93 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2000) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil
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that closely model those in the Clean Air Act. 94 In essence, Congress has
created a cause of action for private citizens to enforce federal environmental
regulations by allowing plaintiffs to seek injunctions against ongoing viola-
tions and, in some instances, penalties that are paid to the government.95
Citizen suit provisions contain notice requirements that were designed to
protect the government's position as primary enforcer. 96 First, at least sixty
days prior to initiating a citizen suit, a person must notify the EPA, the viola-
tor, and under some statutes, the state where the violation occurred. 97 This
built-in "grace period" gives the EPA approximately two months to analyze
the complaint and to decide whether to take over enforcement.98 If the gov-
ernment can show that it is already "diligently prosecuting" the alleged viola-
tion, the citizen suit is barred, although citizen groups may then intervene in
the government's suit.99 The EPA cannot stop a citizen suit merely by com-
mencing an administrative enforcement proceeding, although the EPA can
bar such a suit by commencing an administrative proceeding prior to notice
of the citizen suit or if a citizen group fails to file suit within 120 days of the
notice. °° Finally, once the citizen suit has commenced, a settlement agree-
action on his own behalf against any person. . who is alleged to have violated. . . an emission
standard or limitation under this chapter ....").
94 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2000) ("[A]ny person may
commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person.., who is alleged to be in violation
of any provision of this chapter...."); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000) ("[A]ny
citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person ... who is alleged to
be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter .... ); Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (2000) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil
action on his own behalf against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective
pursuant to this chapter ....").
95 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3), (g)(1) (granting court jurisdiction to
order payment of civil penalties in private suits and providing that such penalties shall be paya-
ble to the United States Treasury). Citizens are also authorized to initiate suits against the EPA
for failure to perform mandatory duties. See, e.g., id. § 7604(a)(2) (allowing a civil action
"against the Administrator where there is alleged failure of the Administrator to perform any
duty ... which is not discretionary").
96 See, e.g., id. § 7604(b)(1)(A). Note that from fiscal years 1985 to 1992, the states, under
the aegis of state implementation plans approved by the federal government, performed over
ninety percent of all site inspections and initiated over eighty percent of all air, water, pesticide,
and hazardous waste enforcement actions. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law
in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authorization Is
Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1572 (1995).
Thus, the state and federal governments, together, were the "original" primary enforcers.
97 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (disallowing action "prior to 60 days after the plain-
tiff has given notice of the violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the viola-
tion occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order").
98 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 47, at 849.
99 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (barring commencement of a pri-
vate civil suit "if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil
action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance ... , but in any such
action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right").
100 Id. § 1319(g)(6). For an in-depth discussion of the courts' interpretation of "court" and
"diligently prosecuting" for purposes of 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), see Hodas, supra note 96, at
1625-32 (analyzing whether an administrative action is an action in a "court" and whether there
is a presumption that the EPA or a state has diligently prosecuted an action).
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ment or consent order may not be entered until the DOJ and EPA receive a
forty-five day notice. 101 In theory, these notification requirements keep the
crown on the sovereign enforcer: the EPA's diligent prosecution bars a citi-
zen suit, and even its failure to prosecute does not forfeit its right to block a
settlement negotiated by the private parties.10 2
But reality often diverges from theory. The balance between public and
private enforcement shifted in 1982 with the emergence of national and re-
gional environmental groups that were well-funded and staffed. 10 3 Public in-
terest groups studied Discharge Monitoring Reports, which the Clean Water
Act requires regulated entities to file, and initiated a plethora of citizen suits
under that Act.'04 A year later, private enforcement exceeded federal en-
forcement efforts, and has been the driving force of environmental litigation
ever since. 0 5 In some years, private enforcement has almost equaled overall
government enforcement. 1° 6
Recently, the Supreme Court has used constitutional standing to place
significant limitations on plaintiffs' ability to maintain citizen suits. The
Court has held that Congress does not create a sufficient interest to grant
plaintiffs standing merely by creating a cause of action for citizen plaintiffs.10 7
To create an interest that rises to the level of injury in fact, Congress must, at
the very least, indicate the interest it means to protect and provide a specific
connection between that interest and the plaintiff that Congress empowers to
sue.108 Pragmatically, this means that a citizen suit plaintiff must establish
that the defendant's violation is causally related to a concrete injury he suf-
fers. The Court has also held that a citizen plaintiff does not have standing to
101 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3).
102 See id. § 1365; see also Hodas, supra note 96, at 1627. But see ENVTL. LAW INST., supra
note 91, at 111-4 (finding that between January 1, 1978, and April 30, 1984, about ten percent of
sixty-day notices led to government enforcement actions); Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 460
("Pragmatically these provisions do little to limit the power of interest groups because the EPA
does not have the resources to prosecute every violation. . . and because sixty days may be an
insufficient time for the EPA . . . to demonstrate diligent enforcement." (citation omitted));
Thompson, supra note 88, at 200 (finding that sixty days "provide insufficient time for the gov-
ernment to decide whether to intervene" and that "government attorneys frequently are content
to allow environmental nonprofits to take the lead in the enforcement actions..., enabling the
government to focus its limited resources elsewhere.").
103 ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 91, at viii.
104 Id.
105 See Hodas, supra note 96, at 1572-73.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding that standing
cannot be predicated on a "public right that [has] been legislatively pronounced to belong to
each individual who forms part of the public").
108 See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although the majority in Lujan purported to
hold that Congress cannot create standing merely by creating a legal right to sue, that majority
was created by inclusion of the votes of Justices Kennedy and Souter. But Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justice Souter, wrote in concurrence:
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of cau-
sation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I
do not read the Court's opinion to suggest a contrary view.... In exercising this
power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vin-
dicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.
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sue to prevent future violations by a defendant who has cured past violations
prior to the suit being filed, even if the defendant did so in response to the
plaintiff's notice of intent to file suit.109 In addition, although citizen plain-
tiffs technically can sue to have a violator pay a fine to the United States
Treasury, the Court has held that such plaintiffs do not have any interest in
having defendants pay the fine unless the plaintiffs can show that the fine will
deter future violations."l 0 Despite these limitations, groups can and do con-
tinue to file citizen suits to cure ongoing or threatened future violations of
environmental statutes and regulations."'
If it is true that "the purpose of the citizen suit provisions is to change
behavior by changing incentives, 112 then it is not by chance that an over-
whelming majority of civil suits brought by national and regional interest
groups were first filed under the Clean Water Act. 1 3 Originally, the Clean
Water Act was the only environmental law that authorized a plaintiff to seek
penalties. 1 14 And although the Act provides for defendants to pay court-or-
dered penalties to the United States Treasury,"15 settlement negotiations can
provide for environmental mitigation projects that essentially channel pay-
ments through third party service organizations that may employ the services
of the same individuals responsible for bringing suit in the first place. 116
109 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57-63
(1987) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that Clean Water Act permits suit for purely past viola-
tions); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (holding that cessation of
allegedly harmful activity in response to onset of litigation does not create any "presumption of
future injury" that would satisfy injury-in-fact requirement of standing).
11o See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184-88 (2000).
In Laidlaw, the Court held that if the defendant continues to violate regulations or a statute after
the citizen suit has commenced, then the plaintiff has standing to sue for penalties to be paid to
the United States because of the deterrent effect of those penalties, even if the defendant subse-
quently cures the violation, unless the defendant can prove that the violations will not be re-
peated. See id.
111 ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 91, at vi (finding a "sharp increase" in citizen enforce-
ment between 1982 and 1994).
112 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 47, at 923.
113 ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 91, at vi (reporting that of the 349 citizen suits filed be-
tween January 1, 1978, and April 30, 1984, 214 had been brought under the Clean Water Act
since 1982).
114 See Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 578 (noting that, although "[o]riginally,
only the Clean Water Act provided that penalties could be imposed in citizen suits," amend-
ments to environmental statutes such as RCRA, CERCLA, the Clean Air Act, and the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right to Know Act now allow citizen plaintiffs to seek
penalties).
115 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 780 F. Supp. 95, 101
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that "it is well established that civil penalties [under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d) (2000)] must be paid to the United States Treasury").
116 See ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 91, at viii; see also Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls
Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) ("While it is clear that a court cannot order a
defendant in a citizens' suit to make payments to an organization other than the U.S. Treasury,
this prohibition does not extend to a settlement agreement whereby the defendant does not
admit liability."). Similar provisions are included in the Clean Air Act, which authorizes the
court to order that civil penalties, "in lieu of being deposited in [a special fund in the United
States Treasury], be used in beneficial mitigation projects which are consistent with" the Clean
Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (2000). The amount is limited to $100,000. Id.
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Today, national and regional environmental groups like the Sierra Club,
NRDC, and the Atlantic States Legal Foundation are responsible for filing a
substantial number of citizen suits.117 As plaintiffs, the groups seek settle-
ment agreements that provide compliance orders, SEPs, monetary penalties,
and of course, attorneys' fees.' 18 This emphasis on financial reward has
drawn criticism from those who see cost calculations as a sign of insincerity.
At least one observer has noted that although groups may portray themselves
as ardent defenders of the environment, they generally choose to prosecute
when a company reports numerous violations to the EPA, thereby decreasing
discovery costs and increasing the potential for large penalties. 119 Supporters
of interest groups' reliance on economic "rewards" insist that having viola-
tors pay such rewards offsets a corporation's calculated choice to violate en-
vironmental regulations. 120 Moreover, even if the monetary rewards are
aimed at self-preservation of the interest groups' business of private enforce-
ment, long-term funding may greatly benefit the environment. 121
The propensity of the group to reach a reasonable settlement with the
alleged violator varies, depending on the nature of the group bringing suit.122
When the plaintiff is a mass membership group, it might prefer the notoriety
that comes from pressing for a big penalty to the certainty of a moderate
settlement. 123 When the plaintiff is a group dominated by a central staff,
however, it may be more interested in obtaining attorneys' fees and pay-
ments to third-party groups controlled by the same staff than in either mak-
ing a name for itself or improving the environment. 124 It is even possible for
a national interest group to derive publicity from having prevented the con-
tinuation of an ongoing violation while reaping the direct monetary payment
of costs and fees.
In fact, there is reason to believe that defendant corporations sometimes
prefer negotiating with citizen enforcers rather than with the EPA and DOJ
officials. 125 In 1984, the Environmental Law Institute ("ELI") studied the
117 See Greve, supra note 91, at 108.
118 Id. at 109-10 (arguing that "[slubstantial portions of [settlements resulting from citizen
suits] constitute direct transfer payments to environmental groups").
119 See Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 462 (explaining that PIGs' decisions to forgo prosecu-
tion of publicly owned wastewater treatment facilities, even though they pollute the water more
often than industries, and their filing of claims for recordkeeping violations, which can only
indirectly benefit the environment, detract from the groups' professed interest in protecting the
environment and point to a stronger incentive for economic relief).
120 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 47, at 929 (reflecting an environmental lawyer's belief
that corporations would not violate the law if violations resulted in lost profits). Corporate of-
ficers are indeed torn between competing interests and duties. For further explanation, see-dis-
cussion infra notes 153-74 and accompanying text.
121 Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 463.
122 For a discussion of the various types of interest groups that might get involved in envi-
ronmental regulation, see id. at 428-34.
123 Id. at 430-32.
124 Id. at 433-34.
125 This may reflect the EPA's traditional role as backup enforcer that comes into the pic-
ture when state enforcement has failed. See Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement "Overfiling" in the
Federal Courts: Some Thoughts on the Post-Harmon Cases, 21 VA. ENVWL. L.J. 425, 426 (2003)
(noting that the EPA needs to be able to file its own case against violators to protect national
enforcement priorities in the face of inadequate state enforcement responses); see also Markell,
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negotiation processes leading to settlement of four citizen suits and con-
cluded that interest groups frequently lack the leverage of government en-
forcers and therefore often settle for amounts below the average consent
decree filed by the government. 126 Although researchers also determined
that there is no "typical" citizen suit settlement process, they did find com-
mon characteristics among the suits. 127 For example, over half of the cases
are initiated by national environmental organizations acting under the Clean
Water Act,128 and many result in a "relatively fast (and fair) settlement for
the large corporation" found in violation of its permit.129
The ELI report, similar to the press coverage of the Exxon Valdez settle-
ment, opens a window into backroom negotiations and allows the observer a
broad understanding of citizen suit settlements. In the second of four case
studies, the report explains how investigations directed by a former EPA en-
forcement attorney, working under the auspices of NRDC, led to Sierra Club
v. United States Gypsum.130 With the aid of student interns and technical
assistants, NRDC reviewed compliance records of all major industrial Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits issued in
selected states and discovered that the Gypsum facility in Oakfield, New
York reported over 125 different violations in less than five years. 31 NRDC
subsequently chose to pursue other cases but offered this lead to the Sierra
Club and its counsel, a former DOJ environmental enforcement official. 132
The Sierra Club sent notice to Gypsum and the EPA on September 17,
1982, and filed its complaint in the Western District of New York on Novem-
ber 23 of that year. 133 It alleged that Gypsum operated and continued to
operate in violation of its permit effluent limitations and sought an injunction
against future violations, discovery of all relevant reports, and an award of
civil penalties and costs, including attorney and consultant fees. 34 Hoping to
avoid negative publicity and intervention by EPA, Gypsum's attorney, a for-
mer EPA associate general counsel, immediately initiated negotiations; by
supra note 5, at 55 (reporting that generally the EPA has been tougher than states on violators of
environmental regulations). This role may justify the EPA using a deterrence-based model after
the violator has gamed the states' cooperative interactions.
126 ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 91, at IV-16, IV-17. The four case studies were Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund v. Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corp., 716 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1983);
Sierra Club v. United States Gypsum, No. 82-1078 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Citizens Coordinating Com-
mittee v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 568 F. Supp. 825 (D.C. Cir. 1983); and
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983). See also Noah,
supra note 57, at 876-96 (detailing the administrative leverage created by an agency's ability to
threaten denial of licenses, dissemination of negative publicity, or imposition of severe
sanctions).
127 See ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 91, at IV-3.
128 Id. at IV-4.
129 Id. at IV-5.
130 See id. at IV-11, IV-12.
131 See id. at IV-12. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Program
regulates wastewater and storm water runoff. From July 1, 1977, to January 31, 1982, Gypsum
reported 139 violations of various types. See id.
132 Id. at IV-12, IV-13.
133 Id. at IV-13.
134 Id.
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July 13, 1983, the parties were in agreement. 135 From the start, negotiations
centered on remedies. 136 Like most Clean Water Act cases, there was no
reason for Gypsum to dispute the allegations made in the complaint; the vio-
lations had been self-reported in compliance with the NPDES program. 137
But the final consent decree "departed markedly" from the government's
typical consent decree. 138 Instead of mandating expensive capital improve-
ments, the decree required Gypsum to hire an environmental consultant "to
review its current operation and maintenance practices."'1 39 And whereas the
EPA generally specifies a certain date for mandatory compliance, this con-
sent decree crossed its proverbial fingers and hoped for compliance at some
point in the near future. 14 In lieu of civil penalties, Gypsum agreed to pay
$25,000 to the Open Space Institute, which would spend the funds on an envi-
ronmental project in New York and credit Gypsum with financing the project
in any and all future press releases. 141 The parties also agreed to stipulated
penalties for future violations or noncompliance with the decree. 42 Finally,
Gypsum paid the Sierra Club $15,000 for costs of litigation and future
monitoring.143
This case illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of citizen enforcement.
While citizen enforcers are free from the political constraints that limit EPA
officials, they are constrained by their need to justify their actions to those
who provide them with money and other support. They also lack the re-
sources and leverage that the government can bring to demand greater reme-
dies. In dealing with the government, defendant corporations negotiate
under the threat of harsh sanctions; but when negotiating with citizen enforc-
ers, the corporations are keenly aware of the interest groups' incentives to
settle.1' Thus, citizen suit consent decrees often provide just enough relief to
avoid EPA intervention and to cover the plaintiff's attorneys fees and associ-
ated costs.
II. Models of Enforcement
The utility of citizen participation in achieving "a credible deterrent to
pollution and greater compliance with the law"145 depends on the behavior of
135 Id. at IV-13, VI-14.
136 See id. at IV-13.
137 See id. at IV-12.
138 Id. at IV-16.
139 Id. at IV-14.
140 See id. at IV-16.
141 Id. at IV-15.
142 Id.
143 Id.
'- See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1352-54 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that a settlement calling for large payments to private environmental groups,
ostensibly to fund efforts to improve water quality, did not violate requirements that civil penal-
ties be paid to the United States Treasury because "no violation of the Act was found or deter-
mined by the proposed settlement"). If the group settles, penalties may be directed toward
third-party organizations; but court-ordered penalties, where the defendant admits liability, must
be paid to the United States Treasury. Id.
145 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, U.S. EPA, STRATEGIC PLAN 11 (2000) [hereinafter
20051
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those subject to regulation-in particular, on the propensity of individuals to
try, in good faith, to comply with regulatory requirements. By one classical
account, man is "solitary, poor, nasty [and] brutish. ' 146 Such a being needs
an external incentive-a deterrence model of enforcement-that imposes
fear of punishment on the regulated entity.147 But, according to a competing
view, man is governed by reason to preserve the "life, health, liberty or pos-
session of others.1' 48 This altruistic being responds better to a cooperative
enforcement scheme that facilitates compliance with what usually is a com-
plex maze of regulatory requirements. 149
But what if Chester Bowles, a member of the 1941 wartime Office of
Price Administration, was correct in his estimate that about two to three per-
cent of the public are inherently dishonest (i.e., not law abiding), twenty per-
cent will obey the law regardless of whether others do, and seventy-five
percent will comply as long as they think that others are not taking advantage
of them by violating the law without being caught and punished? 150 A one-
dimensional system no longer fits all members of society. Under Bowles's
view of man, much stands to be gained by cooperation, but such cooperation
must be backed up by "a credible deterrent"-one that will convince at least
seventy-five percent of the population that violations result in enforcement
actions.' 51 The question the EPA must therefore address is: what role should
citizen participation play in a system that should both allow for the benefits
that come from cooperative enforcement while maintaining a credible threat
against those who refuse to cooperate?
A. Deterrence
The deterrence model views enforcement as a means of inducing poten-
tial violators to comply with regulatory requirements. It implicitly assumes
that violations are harmful and, if possible, would have enforcers detect and
punish every violation. In actuality, that goal is impracticable but also unnec-
essary, according to the deterrence model, because companies will guard
against violating regulations as long as the probability of detection and the
penalty for detected violations are sufficiently great.
2000 STRATEGIC PLAN] (identifying as "Goal 9" serving as "A Credible Deterrent to Pollution
and Greater Compliance with the Law"), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/plan/2000strategic
plan.pdf.
146 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1985) (1651).
147 See John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforce-
ment, 18 LAW & Soc'v REV. 179, 179 (1984) (defining deterrence as a "rule-oriented strategy
[that] seeks to coerce compliance through the maximal detection and sanctioning of violations of
legal rules").
148 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
149 See Scholz, supra note 147, at 180 (defining cooperation as a strategy whose proponents
"emphasize the difficulty of applying abstract rules to complex situations [on the belief that]
attempts to fully enforce legal rules are unlikely to achieve desired ends").
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's statement that legislation is needed to
control "bad men" who would evade and ignore the law 152 is the quintessen-
tial expression of the deterrence model and implicitly adopts Hobbes's view
of human nature. Holmes's assignment of normative attributes may not
make sense in a context where violators are most often corporate bureaucra-
cies attempting to chart a course through a sea of regulations, driven by the
winds of profit rather than the forces of evil.153 Normative gloss aside, how-
ever, proponents of deterrence assert that by acting to maximize profits, busi-
nesses make self-interested decisions regarding compliance and that the legal
system should impose penalties that make violation unprofitable. 154
Assuming that corporations do act to maximize profits, they will "com-
ply where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompli-
ance." 155 The economic benefit of noncompliance equals the costs avoided
by not purchasing pollution control equipment or implementing pollution
control procedures. The costs of noncompliance include the costs of employ-
ing control measures once a violation is detected, plus any additional penal-
ties imposed for being found in violation, multiplied by the probability that
the violations will be detected. 156 The deterrence model aims to increase
152 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address at the Boston University Law
School (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 992 (1997) ("A man who cares nothing for an
ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good
deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can."). Justice
Holmes made his remarks during his tenure as a justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, when he delivered an address at the dedication of the new hall of the Boston University
School of Law. Id. at 991.
153 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,
1268-70 (1982) (arguing that morals are imperfect guides to making environmentally sound
choices because "[n]either polluting nor failing to pollute is a priori the 'ethically' or 'morally'
correct course of action"). Corporate directors may feel constrained by fiduciary duties to the
corporation. As the Supreme Court of Michigan explained, "A business corporation is organ-
ized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are
to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means
to attain that end ...." Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
154 See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of En-
vironmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1186 (1998). Some commentators question
whether corporations act to maximize shareholder value and hence profits. See also William
Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261,
264-76 (1992) (describing the conflict between the conception of the corporation as an entity
designed to maximize share price and as a social entity allowed to make corporate expenditures
to increase the general social welfare). Compare Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 278 (1999) ("[A] public corporation is
a team of people who enter into a complex agreement to work together for their mutual gain....
They enter into this mutual agreement in an effort to reduce wasteful shirking and rent-seeking
by relegating to the internal hierarchy the right to determine the division of duties and resources
in this joint enterprise. They thus agree not to specific terms or outcomes.., but to participation
in a process of internal goal setting and dispute resolution."), with Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996)
(espousing the traditional view that corporate law in developed economies serves the functions
of "maximizing the value of corporate enterprises to investors" or "minimizing the sum of the
transaction and agency costs of contracting").
155 Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1186.
156 Id. at 1186-87. Such "penalties" may include loss of goodwill that can affect the com-
pany's success in the marketplace. See id. at 1191. In doing the cost-benefit calculation when
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penalties and the probability of detection such that the costs of noncompli-
ance will outweigh the benefits, forcing profit-seeking companies to comply
with the law. Thus, deterrence, unlike cooperation, counterbalances the ben-
efits of noncompliance and creates a system of incentives that align busi-
nesses' self-interest with the public's desire that entities comply with statutes
and regulations.
But this system is not flawless. The deterrence model's goal of perfect
enforcement often leads to unreasonable outcomes. This may result from the
fact that in a regulatory system devoted to the rule of law, regulations must
be written that both put those subject to them on notice of what is prohibited
and simultaneously allow the government to prevent behavior that would
have significant deleterious impacts on public welfare. But regulations can-
not be written with perfect precision.157 Technically, they often outlaw be-
havior that, in the context in which it occurs, is benign or even beneficial. For
example, Professors Bardach and Kagan relay a story told to them by the
director of worker safety at an aluminum manufacturing company. 158 Ac-
cording to the safety director, an OSHA inspector ignored the highest prior-
ity risks of the plant and required the company to spend $60,000 for rear exit
doors to their lunchrooms, despite the fact that the rooms were protected by
cinderblock walls, simply because a regulation required "alternative means of
egress" in public spaces. 159
In addition, the sheer number and complexity of our system of regula-
tions leads to significant deviations from optimality. 160 Rules that in isolation
seem reasonable on their face may create burdens that overwhelm those try-
ing to comply.161 In fact, such rules may actually conflict with one another. 162
The unreasonableness of blind application of the rules and the burden im-
posed on industry by the voluminous set of regulations with which they are
supposed to comply create situations in which immediate compliance is not in
the public interest. Astute officials intuitively understand this and use
prosecutorial discretion and the leverage of the threat of prosecution to in-
duce regulated entities to engage in what the officials believe is optimal be-
havior, but which may permit violations of the rules. 163 The cooperative
deciding whether to comply with regulations, profit maximizing companies will discount the fu-
ture cost of compliance and penalties because they occur in the future. See MARK SEIDENFELD,
MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 81 (1996).
157 See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
70-71 (1983) (describing the necessary trade-off between "transparency," "accessibility," and
"congruency").
158 See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 3-5 (1982).
159 Id. at 4-5.
160 See J.B. Ruhl et al., Environmental Compliance: Another Integrity Crisis or Too Many
Rules?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 24, 26-27 (2002) (suggesting that the large volume of




163 See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legis-
lation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 610 (2000) (describing prosecutorial discretion as an "important
mechanism for achieving an optimal level of enforcement and avoiding uproductive social costs
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model of enforcement emerges from this attempt to pursue reasonable
enforcement.
B. Cooperation
The cooperative model views the goals of enforcement as maximizing
the benefits that flow from a regulatory program. It seeks to help companies
comply to the extent that compliance is warranted under the circumstances
that the company and society face.t 64 Under the cooperative model, not all
violations warrant punishment for two reasons. First, the promise of flexible
enforcement can induce regulated entities to look harder for violations and
to share information about violations and potential fixes more readily. Such
cooperation lowers enforcement costs, allowing regulators to address more
violations and to concentrate their resources on those that pose serious envi-
ronmental threats.165 Second, sometimes requiring strict compliance can im-
pose social costs that exceed the costs of the pollution that results from a
violation. 166 For example, a plant may malfunction, and the owner's only
short-term solution to comply with regulations will be to shut down the plant.
But shutting down the plant will throw workers out of jobs and hurt the local
economy. In many such situations, companies need help figuring out what
they can do to comply short of shutting down their plant and may need time
to come into compliance in a manner that does not impose those social costs.
In other cases, application to a particular plant of a regulation that is gener-
ally valid will not achieve the social objectives the regulation was meant to
deliver, in which case compliance is counterproductive. The cooperative
associated with a regulatory regime"); Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1189 (noting that even
under a system that is nominally deterrence based, enforcers use discretion to impose either no
sanction or minimal sanctions on most violators); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.1(c), at 622 (2d ed. 1992) ("Even when it is clear that there
exists evidence which is more than sufficient to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the prose-
cutor might nonetheless decide not to charge a particular individual with a criminal offense.").
164 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1188; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Selecting Strategies of
Social Control over Organizational Life, in ENFORCING REGULATIONS 23-24 (Keith Hawkins &
John M. Thomas eds., 1984) (contrasting deterrence and compliance (cooperative) based systems
of social control). Thus, the EPA has labeled some of its cooperative enforcement efforts as
"compliance incentive" and "compliance assistance" programs, both of which are alternatives to
traditional enforcement approaches. See Markell, supra note 5, at 14-15.
165 Cf. M.L. Friedland, Introduction to SECURING COMPLIANCE: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 3,
11-12, 17-18 (M.L. Friedland ed., 1990) (noting that the relative effectiveness of various enforce-
ment models is still unknown); Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1205-07 (arguing that evidence
does not support claims that cooperation works better than deterrence, and that such arguments
rest on fallacious suppositions about enforcement behavior). See generally Mark A. Cohen, In-
formation as a Policy Instrument in Protecting the Environment. What Have We Learned?, 31
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,425 (2001) (discussing policy implications of environmental
disclosure programs in lieu of regulation). There is no guarantee, however, that cooperative
enforcement will increase environmental benefits because it is uncertain whether cooperation
will actually induce a greater percentage of facilities to comply with regulations and because, by
excusing some noncompliance, cooperation forfeits some pollution reduction from the violations
that the agency addresses.
166 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1216 (noting that "most pollution results from
otherwise productive, economically desirable activity that contributes to the material well-being
of society").
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model of enforcement takes a flexible approach that allows regulators to for-
give violations and to work with plant owners to achieve the goals promised
by the regulatory program.
Cooperative enforcement is predicated on the assumption that many
companies do not choose to violate the law because they are base, but rather
because they find themselves forced to violate regulations by circumstances.
It emphasizes positive behavior and encourages "voluntary" compliance.
Supporters of cooperation believe modern businesses are no longer slave to
short-term cost calculations because corporations have evolved in several
ways. First, some argue that today's businesses possess a sense of social re-
sponsibility to use their resources for the betterment of societies. 167 Under
this theory, directors are "often concerned to do what is right, to be faithful
to their identity as a law abiding citizen, and to sustain a self-concept of social
responsibility. "168
Second, cooperation advocates insist that businesses are driven to com-
ply voluntarily with environmental laws because of externalities such as mar-
ket forces, potential damage to their reputation, and third-party liability
claims. 169 Today's consumers are environmentally sensitive; or at the very
least, their choices are influenced by environmentally concerned interest
groups.170 A corporation's reputation for environmental soundness promotes
better relationships with governmental entities, interest groups, and the pub-
lic at large; when consumers link a corporation's environmental practices
with the quality of its products, compliance increases profits. 171 Conversely,
negative publicity resulting from or accompanying the violations has the po-
tential to damage the corporation financially and may have adverse effects on
the board of directors. 172 The threat of court-ordered damage awards from
tort litigation is significant. 173 Companies that depend on the trust of patrons
face potentially even greater losses from the erosion of goodwill that can
167 See id. at 1191-94 (discussing extent to which corporations act with a sense of social
responsibility in the arena of environmental regulation).
168 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 22. Although the authors recognize that
skeptics may disagree with a director's personal accounting of what motivates his or her own
decisionmaking process, they note that a researcher cannot ignore such. explanations when
"there is evidence of economically irrational compliance with the law." Id. at 23. But see Allen,
supra note 154, at 265 (noting that "[t]o law and economics scholars, who have been so influen-
tial in academic corporate law," the idea that corporations have moral obligations "is barely
coherent and dangerously wrong").
169 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1194-96. For a discussion on the limits of liability
as a substitute for direct regulation, see BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 158, at 278-99.
170 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1195-96.
171 See id. at 1195.
172 See, e.g., id. For example, when faced with the National Highway Transportation Secur-
ity Administration's threat of mandatory recalls of the Firestone Tires used on its Ford Explor-
ers, Ford Motor Corporation "voluntarily" recalled over thirteen million tires on May 22, 2001.
The decision cost the company nearly three billion dollars and was viewed as an effort to deflect
attention away from Ford and onto Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. See Joann Muller, Ford's Gam-
ble, Will It Backfire?: Blaming Firestone Invites New Scrutiny Ford Can Il Afford, Bus. WK.,
June 4, 2001, at 40, 40; see also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 22 (reporting on
interviews with executives from large corporations who "viewed both their personal reputation
in the community and their corporate reputation as priceless assets").
173 See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 158, at 271.
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accompany mere allegations of legal violations. The dual threat of tort liabil-
ity and the loss of business from forfeited goodwill can topple even the giants
of industry. 174 Advocates of the cooperation model contend that most busi-
nesses have strong incentives to act lawfully and suggest that agencies should
view regulated parties as partners rather than adversaries. 175
Cooperation can decrease the costs of detection as well as the costs of
compliance. When inspectors are flexible, rather than recalcitrant, regulated
entities are more forthcoming with information. To some extent, the inspec-
tors depend on the entity's cooperation; for example, Professors Ayres and
Braithwaite explain that "[w]ith nursing home inspections in the United
States and Australia, it is rare for an inspection to take place without one
staff member or another giving the inspection team a tip-off of some
value.' 1 7 6 Although it is true that disgruntled employees may be seeking ret-
ribution, more often they are hoping that their willingness to cooperate will
simply encourage correction of what they perceive to be a problem.177
But cooperation too has its flaws. The cooperation model requires that
regulators exercise broad discretion regarding enforcement, and there is no
guarantee that the regulators will see the balance of interests in the same way
as affected members of the public.178 Moreover, entities that are regulated
under the cooperation model understand that officials exercise discretion in
how they apply the rules, and entities have an incentive to work the system,
to "capture" the regulator, or to put a less malicious spin on their behavior,
to convince regulators or judges that the public interest is best served by
forgiving enforcement. 179 The scenario of cozy relationships between compa-
nies and regulators is in part what drives the need for public interest group
involvement in the enforcement process. 80 In turn, once such groups partici-
174 See, e.g., Peter Behr, Progress in Mansville Case Seen: Judge Grants Delay to Seek Settle-
ment of Asbestos Claims, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1983, at El (reporting that the Mansville Corpo-
ration sought bankruptcy protection because "the mounting damage suits by asbestos workers"
against the company for exposure to asbestos would bankrupt it); Mary Flood & Tom Fowler,
Andersen, or What's Left, to Learn Its Penalty Today; Large Fines Possible in Obstruction Case,
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 16,2002, at lB (reporting that former accounting firm Arthur Anderson
was merely trying to get to the point where it could close its doors because of loss of business
due to indictment for obstruction of justice in the Enron fiasco).
175 For a discussion on why critics of the cooperation model believe these incentives will
not create widespread compliance, see Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1196-1201.
176 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 34.
177 See, e.g., id.
178 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1570-71 (1992).
179 See R. SI-P MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
Acr 198-99 (1983) (describing EPA regional offices as giving violators "time to receive and
install requisite control equipment," allowing "firms in financial trouble to phase in expensive
controls," and sometimes even allowing a firm to operate a facility in violation of permit require-
ments while it builds a replacement facility); id. at 207 (indicating that in enforcement decisions,
courts have tended toward leniency, demanding that "regulators consider compliance costs and
other mitigating factors"); cf. Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1190 (noting that many propo-
nents of cooperative regulation are "businesses who want to be treated more leniently [and]
political leaders with antipathy toward environmental regulation").
180 See Hodas, supra note 96, at 1624 (stating that the fear of agency capture was one of the
motives for citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes).
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pate entities feel the need to protect themselves against the actions of these
groups, both in court and in the marketplace; regulated entities thus hesitate
to release full information about their environmental compliance t81-infor-
mation on which the cooperation model depends.
C. Balancing Deterrence and Cooperation
Whereas scholars and agency officials once debated whether regulatory
programs should be grounded in deterrence or cooperation, most recent dia-
logue favors a careful balance between the two models.182 Both deterrence
and cooperation have been present in the EPA's enforcement program from
its inception, but the EPA's delay in formally recognizing cooperation as an
essential component of its enforcement program led to a tension between
agency practices and the EPA's announced policy. Although the EPA had
stated that its program was grounded in a legalistic, deterrence-based ap-
proach,183 in practice, enforcement officials have often declined to penalize
violators when they believed that the violation was not intentional and that
the best means for curing the violation was through cooperation.'l 4 The
abyss between the stated enforcement policy, based on deterrence, and actual
practice, geared toward prosecutorial flexibility, led critics to claim that en-
forcement officials had been captured by industry. 185
Until recently, reconciliation of the two models was not part of the
EPA's regulatory agenda. In the early 1970s, new statutory penalties re-
flected the theory that only enormous fines could deter violations by
America's most successful corporations,18 6 while regulators often settled for
181 See PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT SURVEY OF
U.S. BUsINESS 28 (1995) (reporting that in 1995, forty-five percent of companies that conducted
environmental audits were hesitant to expand their audit programs because of fears that the
information would be used against them in citizen suits or other enforcement actions); Recht-
schaffen, supra note 154, at 1253 (noting that without legal protections against public disclosure
of self audits, "many firms would forego audits because of fear that the information discovered
will be used against them in enforcement actions or third-party lawsuits"); John S. Guttman,
Environmental Reviews Can Be Kept Confidential, NAT'L L.J., June 20, 1994, at C12 (discussing
legal doctrines companies can use to maintain the confidentiality of their internal compliance
reviews so as to avoid exposure to liability); Marianne Lavelle, Audit Privilege Mobilizes EPA,
Business Bar, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8, 1994, at Al (discussing EPA's attempt to halt passage of state
laws granting a legal privilege to in-house audits of environmental compliance); cf Robert Innes,
Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement, 17 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 239, 252-54 (2001) (noting that the EPA could make its self-audit policy more attractive to
industry by providing immunity against citizen suits for self-reported violations).
182 See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 21 ("Increasingly within both schol-
arly and regulatory communities there is a feeling that the regulatory agencies that do best at
achieving their goals are those that strike some sort of sophisticated balance between the two
models.").
183 See Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1186.
184 See id. at 1189; see also BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 158, at 37 (noting that enforce-
ment officials often "act more like a 'persuader' or educator than a rule-bound bureaucrat").
185 See, e.g., BAROACH & KAGAN, supra note 158, at 44-45 (explaining Ralph Nader's
"capture theory," which characterized enforcers as "weak-willed, lethargic 'captives' of the
industries").
186 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1988) (setting fines at $25,000 for each day that a
corporation was in violation of its permit and $50,000 a day for repeat violators). To put this
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good faith efforts to comply and avoided prosecution. 8 7 Despite its lenient
practices, EPA's public posture remained centered on the deterrence model;
for example, a call for greater deterrence supported Congress's approval of
the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1990, which strengthened the EPA's
power to assess administrative, civil, and criminal penalties.1 88
But the EPA's stated policy has begun to change. Although the EPA
failed to recognize the dichotomy of its deterrence-based procedures and co-
operation-based practices in its Four-Year Strategic Plan for the 1990s, 189
Strategic Plan 2000 explicitly aims to improve both deterrence and coopera-
tion.190 Under its declaration of Goal 9, to provide "a credible deterrent to
pollution and greater compliance with the law," the EPA lists two objectives:
(1) to "improve the environment and protect public health . . .through a
strong enforcement presence," and (2) to "promote the regulated commu-
nity's compliance with environmental requirements through voluntary com-
pliance incentives and assistance programs."'191 Cooperative programs such as
"compliance assistance" and "compliance incentives" have, to some extent,
legitimized the EPA's informal dealings with businesses. 192 Small businesses
in particular have received special treatment. In 1996, Congress enacted the
penalty into perspective, General Motors's yearly operating revenues in 1970 were greater than
the revenues of most countries, and its sales receipts exceeded the combined general revenues of
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Delaware, and the six New England states. See
RICHARD J. BARBER, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION: ITs POWER, ITS MONEY, ITS POLITICS 19
(1970). General Motors was not unique, as at least 175 other corporations had annual sales of at
least a billion dollars. Id.
187 See SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 53-56 (1996) (explaining the EPA policy of preferring administrative
resolution to litigation and stating that incentives disfavor seeking full penalties from violators);
PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 280
(1991) (EPA reserved "formal sanctions [for] ... those cases which [sic] indicated systemic (bad
faith) non-compliance with the effluent limitations"); Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1205-06
(arguing that "enforcement personnel ... eschew formal, legalistic actions and rely heavily on
informal negotiations ... to achieve compliance"); cf BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 158, at 34
(arguing that "enforcement officials must be given broadly worded grants of discretion that will
allow them ... to relax the rules and tailor their enforcement procedures to the situation").
188 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2000). EPA's commitment to deterrence re-
sounds in the words of its Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, James Strock, who warned
regulated entities that "[flor those who stumble off the road of responsible environmental citi-
zenship, the message from EPA enforcement should be clear: The bear is hungry." James M.
Strock, EPA's Environmental Enforcement in the 1990s, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt'l L. Inst.)
10,327, 10,332 (Aug. 1990).
189 See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. EPA, No. 21E-2001, ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR
STRATEGIC PLAN: ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT FOR THE 1990's (1991), availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/clhtml/pubtitle.html.
190 See 2000 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 145.
191 Id. at 55-56 (emphasis added).
192 During fiscal year 2001, the EPA provided compliance assistance to more than 550,000
businesses; supported ten Web-based Compliance Assistance Centers to help small and medium-
sized businesses, local governments, and federal facilities; and introduced the National Assis-
tance Clearinghouse, a Web-based searchable reference guide for compliance assistance materi-
als. See Press Release, supra note 9. Under its Audit and Small Business Policies, EPA offered
waivers or significant reductions in penalties for facilities that detected, disclosed, and corrected
environmental violations. See id.
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Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act,' 93 requiring federal
agencies like the EPA to develop programs that provide for the reduction
and waiver of minor violations by small businesses when the violation is cor-
rected within a reasonable period or is discovered in a compliance-assistance
program. 194 As previously stated, the EPA's enforcement officers have been
forgiving violations since the agency's inception; now they have formal au-
thorization to do so.
Compliance assistance and incentive programs, however, have not been
welcomed by all. Critics argue that even if forgiveness of first-time violations
is reasonable, mandated reduction or waiver of penalties even in minor situa-
tions may be unwarranted, 195 for example, when offenders repeatedly violate
regulatory requirements. This approach "often signals to the regulated com-
munity that it need not comply until enforcement begins. ' 196 Moreover, the
programs complicate citizen involvement in the enforcement process; citizens
must determine where they fit within the hybrid, how they can contribute to
cooperative activities, and whether they can deter pollution in spite of EPA's
tolerance of violations.
III. Citizen Participation in Enforcement
Citizen participation has been touted as an answer to the EPA's
problems of detection, political and institutional constraints, and lack of re-
sources, 197 but arguably there is a need for the EPA to maintain some control
over the roles that citizens play. When asked to speak at a symposium enti-
tled Innovation in Environmental Law, Stanford Law Professor Buzz Thomp-
son declared that "the most pervasive, prominent, and continuing innovation
in the modern environmental era has been the involvement of citizens in the
enforcement of environmental laws."'198 Professor Thompson explained that
while citizen involvement promotes democratic values, it also triggers con-
cerns that citizen groups may misuse the information and power they obtain
by such involvement. 199
193 See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
110 Stat. 857 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808, 15 U.S.C. § 657).
194 See id. § 223.
195 Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1241-42; see also BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note
158, at 127 (arguing that the best regulators "are capable of being strict when necessary but also
have the knowledge and skill to take calculated risks").
196 Hodas, supra note 96, at 1616-17; cf. Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1221-22 (noting
the converse-that "deterrence reaffirms for the public that environment statutes are important
and transgressions are to be taken very seriously").
197 See Hodas, supra note 96, at 1620-21 (noting that citizen suits play an important role in
large part due to EPA's lack of enforcement resources and the reticence of states to rigorously
enforce environmental regulations); Thompson, supra note 88, at 187-88 ("Most analysts of citi-
zen suits, both supporters and critics, have assumed that the principal purpose of citizen suits is
to overcome obstacles to effective public enforcement, such as limited agency resources and the
structural risk of agency underenforcement."); cf. Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1232-34
(contending that citizen enforcers are neither interested nor particularly well suited to participat-
ing in cooperative enforcement schemes).
198 Thompson, supra note 88, at 185.
199 See, e.g., id. at 188.
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In evaluating citizen participation in enforcement, it is helpful to identify
the precise benefits that citizens can provide. Citizens can contribute to en-
forcement in at least two ways: first, by monitoring pollution and companies'
compliance with regulations; second, by directing their private resources to
prosecute violators.20 0
A. Monitoring
Citizen monitors are an integral part of environmental enforcement.
They live and work in close proximity to potential sources of pollution and
therefore often are the best sources of information and the most able wit-
nesses of environmental violations.20 1 Approximately 12,000 nonprofit moni-
toring organizations and "keepers" 20 2 have developed programs and
strategies for addressing environmental concerns.20 3 The groups, ranging in
size anywhere from a few individuals to a few thousand volunteers, are com-
prised most often of lay people with no prior experience in environmental
monitoring or data collection; nonetheless, they patrol local environments for
potential violations and report their findings to local agencies or the EPA.20 4
The EPA "encourages the public to 'keep their eyes and ears open' and
to contact the appropriate ... authorities whenever they notice a potential
pollution problem" because the agency's enforcement program benefits from
citizen monitoring in several ways.20 5 First, monitoring groups have histori-
cally focused on waterways, where detection of violations is most difficult.2 °6
Rather than relying on enforcement officers to find water pollution in a hit-
or-miss fashion, the EPA depends on citizen monitors who are distinctly fa-
miliar with the area and who are more likely to detect changes in water qual-
ity or marine ecosystems.20 7 Second, not-for-profit monitoring groups do not
face political and bureaucratic constraints that can stifle innovation. Al-
though the government subsidizes citizen monitors directly through grants or
indirectly through tax deductions for charitable contributions, the groups rely
heavily on private funding, which in some instances encourages them to use
200 See id. at 192 (identifying three roles for the citizen enforcer: prosecutor, monitor, and
informant).
201 See Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 574.
202 Thompson, supra note 88, at 220-21 ("Borrowing the concept of a 'riverkeeper' from
English private waterways, the journalist Robert Boyle in 1969 proposed that the Hudson River
needed a riverkeeper to protect it.... [During the 1990s, riverkeepers grew into] a loose confed-
eration of approximately three dozen keeper programs in almost twenty states." (citations
omitted)).
203 Id. at 218. For a brief history of citizen monitoring, see Virginia Lee, Volunteer Monitor-
ing: A Brief History, VOLUNTEER MONITOR (Volunteer Monitor, San Francisco, Cal.), Spring
1994, at 29, http://www.epa.gov/owow/monitoring/volunteer/newsletter/volmon06nol.pdf.
204 Thompson, supra note 88, at 218.
205 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE (1990), available at http://www.epa.gov/region4/air/enforce/citizenf.htm.
206 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 88, at 224 ("Formal inspections are a relatively ineffi-
cient method of monitoring miles of waterways; if an inspector is not in the right place at the
right time, violations can easily go undetected.").
207 See id. at 217-26 (discussing role of citizen monitors and their ability to develop strate-
gies appropriate to their locale).
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innovative techniques for monitoring pollution.2°8 For example, the Cook
Inlet Keeper has developed an innovative monitoring system and compiled
an extensive database that tracks environmental hazards, and the group
raises revenue by charging for access to this database.2 9 The EPA profits
from the additional monitoring data made available as a result of these inno-
vations. Finally, citizen monitoring provides the EPA with resources it des-
perately lacks: manpower and money.210 Monitors often work "in tandem
with the government," sharing technical and organizational information. 211
The groups educate the public through programs, hotlines, and various publi-
cations; they encourage the average citizen to get involved. 212Citizen groups that merely monitor pollution fit easily within a hybrid
model of deterrence and cooperation; their involvement in the enforcement
program results in few tradeoffs or concerns. Frequently, citizen monitors
work closely with businesses and government agencies and usually defer to
the regulators' prosecutorial discretion.213 Instead of filing citizen suits, mon-
itoring groups and keepers most often provide public agencies with informa-
tion and try to convince federal enforcers to prosecute violators.2 14
From this perspective, one can understand why few people criticize the
role that citizens play as monitors in the enforcement program.2 15 But while
scholars like Professor Thompson praise citizen monitoring because it
"dull[s] the distinction between the private and public realms, 2 16 one might
argue against the program for the very same reason. Citizen groups express
concerns about pollution that may reflect their idiosyncratic interests rather
than the preferences of the broader polity to which state and federal regula-
tors answer.
208 See id. at 194.
209 See Cook Inlet Keeper, Watershed Network, at http://www.inletkeeper.org/water-
shednetw.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
210 See Thompson, supra note 88, at 223 ("Direct grants, if carefully tailored to provide the
necessary infrastructure needed to attract more volunteer monitors, can provide a similar lever-
aging of the government's limited resources.").
211 See id. at 224-25.
212 See id. at 225.
213 See id. at 222 (noting that only twenty-three percent of citizen monitoring groups col-
lected data specifically for enforcement purposes).
214 See, e.g., United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992).
The prosecution in Goodner resulted from the report of a citizen, who witnessed two men dump-
ing toxic-smelling waste into a ravine located on a farm near an aircraft refurbishing company.
See id. at 383. The citizen reported the violation to the EPA despite the farm owner's reassur-
ances that there was no cause for concern. See id. EPA investigators discovered that the owner
had dumped approximately twenty-five tons of waste from removers and old paint and filed suit
under CERCLA and RCRA. See id. at 382-83. For a discussion of the circumstances of this
case, see also Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 3, at 575.
215 See Thompson, supra note 88, at 226 ("The most common criticism is directed not at
citizen monitoring but at the use of the monitoring data to either file citizen suits or criticize
governmental agencies in the media for ineffective enforcement.").
216 Id. at 225.
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B. Prosecution
Although legislators authorizing the citizen suit provision under the 1970
Clean Air Act believed they were merely extending an established history of
private compensation and qui tam actions,217 controversy has surrounded the
power delegated to private citizens acting under environmental citizen suit
provisions. Regulated entities cringe at the prospect of dual enforcement 21 8
and worry that private enforcers will interfere with established relationships
and understandings. 219 For example, one of the major impediments to the
efforts of states and EPA to induce companies to implement self-audit pro-
grams is the fear on the part of the companies that some overly zealous inter-
est group will use the information they provide to sue them.220  Other
members of the regulatory community share "widespread skepticism about
both the motivations of private enforcers and their legitimacy as surrogates
for government."'1 2 1 Critics fear that private enforcers will replace the gov-
ernment's "leniency error," its failure to pursue actions that would produce
public benefits, with the "zealousness error," which is created when pursuit
of individual benefits imposes public costs. 222 Even the federal courts have
expressed concern that enforcement of the law is the proper province of the
executive branch and not the citizenry generally.22 3
But citizen suits are not necessarily maniacal exercises of power. In-
deed, one of the benefits produced by citizen suits, namely, increased compe-
tition for enforcement, has far surpassed the effects originally envisioned. 224
At the federal level, "the growth of private enforcement is acting as a com-
217 Id. at 196. Citizen suits were not mere reproductions of existing private right actions.
They expanded the existing notions of injury and the legitimate interest of private citizens and
extended the accepted role of private plaintiffs. Id. at 197.
218 See ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 91, at ix.
219 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 47, at 959.
220 A 1995 study of industry sectors with more than 100 employees and with annual sales
exceeding $100 million revealed that, of the companies that conducted environmental audits,
forty-five percent were hesitant to expand their auditing program because they feared their self-
policing would be used against them in citizen suits and enforcement actions. See PRICE
WATERHOUSE LLP, supra note 181, at 28; see also Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Carey Ann Ma-
thews, Environmental Democracy, 22 J. CoRP. L. 395, 398 (1997) ("Government and business
are also aware, however, that increased self-policing increases vulnerability to lawsuits.").
221 See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 47, at 959.
222 Thompson, supra note 88, at 201.
223 Thus, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), Justice Scalia opined:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive of-
ficers' compliance with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is
to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Execu-
tive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."
Id. at 577 (citation omitted); see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000) (explicitly holding in abeyance the question of whether congres-
sional creation of qui tam actions violates the president's power under Article II's Appointment
or Take Care Clauses).
224 Thompson, supra note 88, at 198-99. Professor Thompson qualifies the benefit of com-
petition in the regulatory system by admitting that competition in public enforcement "is only
loosely analogous to competition in private markets" because government enforcers do not have
to compete to survive. Id. at 199.
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petitive spur to government enforcers, prodding them to improve their man-
agement tools for measuring, securing, and overseeing compliance. 2 5
Additionally, competition from private enforcers may have been the impetus
for the EPA's innovative settlements and its reconciliation of policies and
practices.22 6
Citizen suits can also reinforce democratic values in our system of envi-
ronmental regulation. Giving citizens a voice at the enforcement stage of the
regulatory process can play an important role in keeping regulators publicly
accountable.2 2 7 Although the Administrative Procedure Act affords citizens
the opportunity to affect the content of regulation, 2 8 the actual impact of
regulation on the behavior of polluters depends on how those regulations are
applied. An agency could alter the meaning of a regulation simply by con-
struing it in a manner contrary to the understanding of the citizens who may
have been involved in and even supported its promulgation,22 9 and "[m]any
interpretive issues arise only at the enforcement stage of a statute's imple-
mentation. 2 30 Without the private right to file suit, agencies could simply
elide the interpretive issue by refusing to attempt to enforce the regulation in
a context that would raise the issue.
IV. Potential Solutions
Ultimately, governmental regulators are charged with the task of creat-
ing enforcement mechanisms that will capture the benefits of citizen partici-
pation without incurring the potential detriments. 231 An effective mechanism
will allow citizen participation to continue to prod the government to enforce
regulations sufficiently to deter deleterious violations while avoiding the pit-
falls of inflexibility and conflicts of interest that can plague such participa-
tion. The remainder of this Article describes three solutions designed to ease
the tension between deterrence and cooperation and to resolve the discrep-
ancies between government-initiated and citizen-initiated enforcement.
The first potential solution, "tripartism,'2 32 proposes that self-selected
public interest groups should be included in the regulatory process on equal
225 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 47, at 957.
226 SEPs are examples of the potential for innovation under competitive enforcement.
Thompson, supra note 88, at 207; see also Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 47, at 957 ("[T]here is
no doubt that private enforcement helped to keep compliance issues high on the agendas of top
agency officials .. ").
227 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 88, at 198-99.
228 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
229 For example, one problem that plagues negotiated rulemaking is that supporters of the
negotiated rule, which the agency then promulgates, challenge the agency's later interpretation
and application of the rule. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Per-
formance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 Du-E L.J. 1255, 1324-25 (1997) (giving examples in
which groups represented in negotiation of rules later challenged the rules claiming that the
adopted rule deviated from the negotiated consensus); Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 453.
230 Thompson, supra note 88, at 209.
231 See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173,211-28 (1997) (describing some of the problems
caused by unrestricted participation in the administrative process).
232 The term tripartism was coined by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, who built on game
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footing with the agency. The second solution, "corporatism," gives agencies
the power to handpick interest groups to represent the public in enforcement
negotiations.233 For reasons discussed below, both of these solutions, tripart-
ism and corporatism, are of limited effect and introduce new problems into
current mechanisms for enforcement. The final solution, which we label "de-
liberative participation," is perhaps the most promising; it creates a limited
empowerment of citizen enforcers within the existing framework of judicial
review of agency action.234
A. Tripartism
1. The Problem of Strategic Behavior Between Regulators and Regulated
Entities
Tripartism calls for the empowerment of private citizens so that they can
participate in regulatory decisionmaking on the same footing as regulators
and regulated entities. This approach to citizen participation was developed
to ensure against capture and corruption of agencies charged with imple-
menting regulatory programs. 235
According to standard accounts of evolutionary game theory,236 the so-
cially optimal enforcement strategy is tit-for-tat ("TFT"), a strategy in which
the agency cooperates with regulated entities who are cooperating but shifts
to deterrence if the entity attempts to exploit the agency's cooperative na-
ture. 237 Unlike the traditional debate about the efficacy of cooperation ver-
sus deterrence, the teachings of evolutionary game theory do not depend on
any altruistic assumptions about human behavior; rather, it is grounded in the
theory of rational choice; yet, the theory still leads to the conclusion that
mutual cooperation not only is socially optimal, but that it results from the
theoretic models of cooperative enforcement developed by John Scholz. See AYRES &
BRAimWArrE, supra note 10, at 57-59.
233 See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
234 See infra Part IV.C.1.
235 Tripartism was the response of Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite to John Scholz's applica-
tions of evolutionary game theory to regulatory programs generally, and enforcement in particu-
lar. See AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 10, at 57-59. See generally Scholz, supra note 147;
John T. Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effective-
ness, 85 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 115 (1991) [hereinafter Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforce-
ment] (applying game theory to the problem of cooperative enforcement strategies and the effect
of policy beneficiaries on enforcement); John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory
Policy, 6 LAW & POL'Y 385 (1984) (discussing "Tit for Tat" enforcement strategy based on game
theory).
236 For further discussion on the origin and details of evolutionary game theory, see Robert
Axelrod, Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 24 J. CONFLlCT RESOL. 3 (1980); Erica
Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a Global Economy, 37
IND. L. REV. 141, 157-65 (2003).
237 See Scholz, supra note 147, at 189-93 ("[T]he agency can elicit cooperation in the con-
tinued 'game' by combining cooperation and deterrence in a simple TFT strategy: use deterrence
against all firms that evaded in the last round and cooperate with all other firms."); see also
AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 10, at 22 ("TFT is an unusually robust policy idea because
radically divergent accounts of regulation converge of the efficacy of T-T.").
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strategy that best serves the interests of both the agency and the regulated
entity.238
Proponents of tripartism examined the application of game theory to
regulatory enforcement and asked a seemingly simple question: "How do we
secure the advantages of the evolution of cooperation while averting the
evolution of capture and corruption? 2 39 As noted earlier, TFT requires a
cooperation-first mentality. Optimal benefits are dependent on the coopera-
tion of each of the two parties; if either defects, the benefit is lost. Thus,
maximization of the benefits of TFT strategies is most likely when the parties
know and trust each other. But this familiarity invites opportunity for cap-
ture and corruption. 240 The problem is not easily solved. Without familiarity,
TFT fails because it is based on the "perceived probability in any given round
that there will be another round. '241
Tripartism purports to find an answer to the capture-corruption conun-
drum in empowerment of public interest groups. 242 Proponents of tripartism
contend that when such groups enter the game on equal footing with the
other players, the groups have the potential to prevent capture and corrup-
tion.243 Empowering stakeholders to participate on an equal footing with
regulators and regulated entities demands mechanisms for citizen participa-
tion that might appear similar to existing mechanisms but that go significantly
beyond opportunities for participation under current law. First, tripartism
grants public interest groups access to all of the information available to the
agency, provides them with a seat at the negotiating table, and authorizes
them to prosecute regulated entities as if they were the regulator.244 Thus,
whether the agency proceeds by administrative action or civil suit, affected
public interest groups would have the ability to veto any settlement the
agency reaches with the regulated entity. Moreover, if an agency decided
238 See Scholz, supra note 147, at 208. Several real world factors may inhibit the benefits of
cooperation-first. If regulated entities are relatively diverse, or if they fail to recognize the ad-
vantages of cooperation, for example, they will shatter the beneficial outcome achieved only
through mutual cooperation. Id. at 219. In other words, TFT can easily spiral down into mutual
noncooperation if either the regulator or company deviates from cooperation. Some recent
work on evolutionary game theory suggests that variations on the simple TFT strategy may
promise benefits similar in magnitude to those that follow from TFT, but which are more stable
in the real world, where defections by either party can occur inadvertently or because one player
misreads the implications of the other player's actions. See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS
OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION AND WELFARE 110-15 (1986); Karl Sigmund, Automata for Repeated
Games, in EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS IN DEMOCRACIES 335, 340-42 (Johann Gotschl ed., 2001)
(proposing "contrite tit-for-tat" as a potentially optimal strategy); M.A. Nowak et al., The Arith-
metics of Mutual Help, Sc. AM., June 1995, at 76, 79-80 (proposing a strategy called "Pavlov"
for overcoming the potential downward spiral of repeated prisoners dilemma to perpetual
retaliation).
239 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 56.
240 See id.
241 See Scholz, supra note 147, at 189.
242 The authors purposefully avoid qualification of what types of organizations qualify as
PIGs, but they suggest that political elections will ensure that the groups include representatives
of both public and private interests. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 58.
243 See id. at 56, 71-75 (noting that the addition of a third party increases the costs of
capture).
244 This is the same power granted under qui tam provisions. See id. at 166 n.4.
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that strict regulatory compliance was inappropriate with respect to a particu-
lar violation and therefore pursued a cooperative approach to enforcement, a
public interest group could sue to demand strict compliance, and the agency
would not be free to stop such a suit via its own enforcement action. Second,
the public interest group is a "contestable guardian" in a republican sys-
tem.245 To create contestability, tripartism envisions a two-tiered process
with at least two layers of competition. The most appropriate interest group
is first selected to represent public or private interests either through the vote
of a "peak council of [public interest groups]" or by popular election.246 The
chosen interest group then elects a representative from within its organiza-
tion to take part in the negotiations.247 In this two-tiered system, not only
must public interest groups vie for the privilege of acting as the third party in
negotiations, but their leaders must also compete within their own groups for
election as chief negotiator. Through equal access and direct, contestable
participation, tripartism theorizes that interest groups restore the potential
for optimal benefits.
In short, implementation of tripartism in the enforcement context would
require small but significant modifications to the law governing citizen en-
forcement. Empowering citizens requires that interest groups not only be
able to bring suits, but that the government not be able to usurp this preroga-
tive and then proceed to pursue an agenda different from that of the interest
group plaintiff. Thus, full empowerment suggests that citizen suit provisions
would have to be changed to allow interest groups to maintain such suits
even when the government was diligently prosecuting violations on its own or
when the government had already agreed to settle the matter. In addition,
tripartism would require legislative change to set up democratic mechanisms
both between and within interest groups that would allow, classes of affected
citizens to choose their representative at the enforcement table.
2. Critiques of Tripartism
Tripartism is premised on each class of stakeholders that share a com-
mon interest in a regulatory system being able to select a representative in
the regulatory process. There is, however, no feasible way to enable each
class of stakeholders in a complex and constantly evolving regulatory system
to select a representative who will effectively represent its interests. Before
tripartism could operate, the government would have to set up some mecha-
nism for identifying members of each class of stakeholders and the interest
groups that belong in that class. Proponents of tripartism do not provide any
criteria by which government could make such choices. Moreover, to be true
245 Id. at 57-58 (suggesting that PIGs should rely on a democratic system that enables
members to remove captured leaders and that PIGs should compete for appointment to the
negotiating table); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 492-96 (discussing election of stakeholder
representatives as a means of limiting empowerment).
246 AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 10, at 58, 166 n.5 (explaining that "political parties
would be expected to include in their election platforms policies about which PIGs or PIG peak
councils would be privileged as representatives of labor, environmental, and consumer groups,
and how and under what circumstances they would be privileged").
247 See id. at 58.
20051
The George Washington Law Review
to tripartism, the government could not simply invite a subset of affected
interests; all of the interests must be represented at the table. In addition, it
would not be sufficient to establish classes of stakeholders at some initial
point in time and not revisit whether that classification scheme makes sense
as stakeholders' interests change in response to external circumstances as
well as the evolution of the regulatory system itself.248
To illustrate the problems created by the requirement that all interests
be represented, consider the issue of maintaining old growth forest to protect
the endangered spotted owl in the Northwest United States. It may not be
sufficient to have one interest group represent all environmentalists. Some
environmentalists might have an instrumental objection to destruction of the
habitat because they use the forests at issue. Others may have a moral objec-
tion. Still others may be instrumentalists who support species preservation
because of the uncertainty of the future cost of having species go extinct. All
of these environmentalists have different interests at stake; depending on the
precise contours of any regulatory scheme ultimately adopted, they may
agree or disagree about the desirability of that scheme. Yet tripartism pro-
vides no clue about whether these environmentalists should be lumped to-
gether or entitled to separate representation, or how this decision should be
made . 249
Furthermore, tripartism is grounded on a recognition that the present
system's emphasis on "backroom" settlements fails to assure the public that
negotiations are conducted at arms' length, but tripartism fails adequately to
answer the fear that citizen empowerment could interfere with the relation-
ship of regulatory agencies and regulated entities necessary to realize the
benefits of cooperative enforcement. Cooperative enforcement requires that
the parties develop an ongoing relationship that allows them to build trust in
one another. But interest groups often lack the means and the incentives to
maintain such a relationship.
The paradigmatic environmental group-usually a local organization
whose members provide both the financing and control of the group and ma-
terially benefit from pollution reduction-usually will not have the resources
and technical expertise to meaningfully monitor compliance. 250 They are best
at identifying a particular local environmental problem, such as a noticeable
pollution discharge, and complaining about it until the effects are eliminated.
248 One could limit representation to a subset of stakeholders, and decide on makeup of the
appropriate stakeholder class at the outset, and not allow representation to change to reflect the
evolution of the regulatory system. Such an approach, however, would correspond to what I
have labeled corporatism, which I discuss below. See infra Part V.B.
249 The issue is similar to that raised in labor law, when disputes arise about the appropriate
contours of a bargaining unit. See Rafael Gely, A Tale of Three Statutes... (and One Industry):
A Case Study on Competitive Effects of Regulation, 80 OR. L. REv. 947, 960 (2001) (describing
the National Labor Relations Board's discretion in choosing appropriate bargaining units au-
thorized to engage in collective bargaining with employers). In the labor context the issue is
simpler because the government has only established one interest-organized labor-to join in
the regulatory scheme, and it has not reassessed who should be allowed at the table to negotiate
collective bargaining agreements with employers since passing the major labor statutes in the
1930s and 40s.
250 Rechtschaffen, supra note 154, at 1233-34.
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But they are not very effective at monitoring steps the polluter takes to en-
sure against future discharges.
Even though members of such local groups directly benefit from pollu-
tion reduction and hence stand to gain in the long run from implementation
of a cooperative approach to enforcement, each individual local group may
not have the incentive to develop the requisite relationship with polluters.
Although environmental protections might be maximized by increased use of
cooperative enforcement generally, incentives for individual interest groups
may be to seek maximal penalties in their individual cases. Essentially, each
plaintiff will try to free-ride and maximize deterrence of pollution that affects
them by threatening to sue for harsh penalties in their case even if that un-
dermines the benefits of cooperation in similar cases to which they are not
parties.2 51 Cooperation may represent the socially preferable long-run equi-
librium, and hence, over time, parties may begin to understand the potential
for optimal benefits under a cooperative system. But there is no guarantee
that this will occur, and short-run incentives may drive individual interest
groups away from cooperation. Accordingly, there is little reason to agree
with proponents of empowerment who contend that interest groups will learn
to trust government regulatory enforcement, which will alleviate concerns
that these groups will abuse their added enforcement powers.25 2
The internal dynamics of central staff and mass membership groups may
exacerbate the tendency of such groups to avoid cooperative enforcement
even when cooperation promises benefits to group members. Tripartism de-
pends on the ability of public interest groups to self-select appropriate repre-
sentatives and on the willingness of those representatives to cooperate.
Tripartism assumes that interest groups will represent the viewpoints of their
members; but in today's public interest groups, leaders seldom reflect the
political ideologies of individual members. Instead, the most direct goal of
the "central staff" of such groups is collection of fees and costs, which they
can derive from litigation but not from a continued monitoring presence at a
facility. 253 "Mass membership" groups are funded by members who rarely
participate in group activities.254 Their market for membership creates per-
251 See Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement, supra note 235, at 124. Even compa-
nies other than the defendant in the particular citizen suit may support strict compliance in that
suit as a way of gaining a competitive advantage. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 158, at 18
("Antibusiness social groups are often joined in pushing for more protective regulation by dis-
tinctly 'probusiness' groups and, in fact, by businesses. Regulation usually affects competitors
unevenly, imposing relatively higher costs on some than on others and creating advantages for
low-compliance-costs firms.").
252 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing how sustained interaction necessitated by collaborative governance
helps participants build trust rather than developing adversarial relationships). See generally
AYRES & BRAIT1WAITE, supra note 10, at 71-73, 82-84 (discussing how empowerment of PIGs
raises the "costs of capture"; arguing that PIGs will not demand a higher standard of compliance
with regulations than that required by law because they will be counterbalanced by industry
demands for a lower standard).
253 Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 474 (asserting that national interest groups do not par-
ticipate in EPA's XL projects because they cannot generate revenue or notoriety by doing so).
254 See, e.g., id. at 430-33.
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verse incentives for leaders to take extreme or idiosyncratic positions .25  Po-
tential contributors are often ill-informed about a group's activities and may
be swayed by publicity that sets one group apart from the others. Zealous
activism is rewarded by individuals who seek to identify with a cause joining
the notorious group. Market forces, therefore, create a disincentive for mass
membership groups to cooperate in the manner predicted by evolutionary
game theory. This does not mean that a regulatory program dependent on
group cooperation is entirely futile; it merely indicates that problems are
likely to arise if public interest groups are left to self-select their
representatives.2 56
B. Collaborative Governance and the Corporatist Model
1. Giving Preselected Groups a Permanent Place in the Regulatory
Scheme
The corporatist model recognizes that "empowerment may succeed in
reducing the costs of adversarialism and improving the flexibility of regula-
tion. '2 57 Under this model, however, rather than making the seat at the ne-
gotiating table contestable, the government chooses the interest groups that
will represent preselected stakeholder interests that the government has de-
cided deserve a permanent place in the monitoring and enforcement scheme.
Corporatism still allows for the leadership of that group-or, more rele-
vantly, the selection of the individual who will represent that group in the
enforcement process-to be contested.
The corporatist model greatly increases the opportunities for coopera-
tive enforcement compared with those afforded by tripartism. Corporatism
overcomes the lack of incentives and expertise that are likely to plague
tripartism. Because the place at the table for a selected group is relatively
permanent, the group can derive reputational benefits that allow it to attract
members and grants from benefactors looking to influence enforcement deci-
sions. Thus, groups have a substantial incentive to be chosen and to maintain
their place in the bargaining process. Moreover, the relative permanence of
255 See id. at 432 (explaining that competition may "exacerbate rather than mollify" ex-
tremist tendencies (citations omitted)).
256 See id. at 427-28 (arguing that group leaders who interact with agencies on an ongoing,
long-term basis may personally benefit from cooperation with regulators).
257 Id. at 445. "Corporatism" has been defined as follows:
[A] system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically or-
dered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not cre-
ated) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their
respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection
of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.
Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in TRENDS TOWARD CORPORATIST IN-
TERMEDIATION 7, 13 & n.22 (Philippe C. Schmitter & Gerhard Lehmbruch eds., 1979); see also
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 166 n.5 (describing Schmitter's proposal for a voucher
system where "[a]ll citizens would get vouchers, representing a promise of funds to be paid out
of consolidated revenue to PIGs. The state could then be considered to privilege the PIGs who
received [the] most vouchers.").
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a group's presence facilitates development of the expertise necessary to par-
ticipate in cooperative enforcement.
The opportunity for cooperation is strengthened when regulators can ex-
clude extremist groups who are willing to act unreasonably to further their
causes. 258 And because only preselected groups get to participate in the bar-
gaining process, extreme factions cannot gain entrance by splintering from
mainstream groups and asserting that they represent different interests that
must also be allowed to participate in the process. Thus, industry has less to
fear from revealing information about violations to the agency and participat-
ing interest groups because it has some assurance that these groups will not
unreasonably try to shut down plants by filing enforcement actions. For ex-
ample, had corporatism applied in the Exxon Valdez incident, EPA officials
might have called for a representative of all Alaskan fishermen living and
working in Prince William Sound to join government officials and Exxon ex-
ecutives in settlement negotiations. The representative, elected through vot-
ing mechanisms internal to the industry, would have been granted equal
access to information and would have entered the process with full par-
ticipatory rights. Subsequently, all fishermen would have been bound by the
terms of the agreement. Such a plan might have focused the settlement more
on long-term restoration of the ecosystem and less on saving individual pho-
togenic animals.
2. Critiques of the Corporatist Approach
Although stakeholder involvement may decrease costs and provide the
parties with creative solutions, the corporatist model is imperfect. 259 First,
because agencies control the selection of interest groups, they have the abil-
ity to ignore valid concerns and to reward parties who are most likely to
agree with the government's position.260 Just as the cooperative model raises
concerns about agency capture, the corporatist model creates an opportunity
for "reverse capture," a scenario characterized by an agency offering seats at
the enforcement table to third parties sympathetic to its cause. Second, be-
cause the right to participate becomes a valuable endowment groups and in-
dividuals within groups will compete for that privilege and may devote
resources to obtaining or maintaining themselves in the privileged position
rather than to representing their constituencies to the best of their abilities. 261
258 Cf Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 445-46.
259 Stakeholders include representatives of those directly affected by the regulated entity's
violations.
260 See Seidenfeld, supra note 2, at 488 ("Allowing agencies to exclude groups from the
regulatory process ... would be problematic because it might allow agencies to exclude those
groups most likely to oppose a sweetheart regulatory deal .... ").
261 The guaranteed place for the group in the enforcement process removes constraints that
competition among groups would place on group leaders' abilities to act in their self-interest at
the expense of group members. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1466-67
(1992) (making a similar point that lack of competition in product markets gives corporate man-
agers more leeway to self-deal). The corporatist model is commonly used in Europe for structur-
ing environmental protection. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 188-89 (2001). In the United States, regulation of labor relations
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Finally, to be truly effective, the corporatist model must exclude extremist
groups from the entire settlement process, including judicial review. To the
extent that regulatory decisions affect fundamental interests of members of
these groups, however, our political system may be unwilling to exclude them
from the enforcement process. 262 Hence, although the corporatist model an-
swers the threat of extremism raised by tripartism, it is unlikely to serve as a
general model of citizen participation in the enforcement process.
C. Deliberative Participation
1. Operational Mechanisms for Deliberative Participation in
Enforcement
Deliberative participation is predicated on the view that citizen groups
should be empowered to communicate their views to the agency and force
the agency to explain and justify its decisions in light of those communica-
tions. By doing so, information, concerns, and values held by the public can
influence prosecutorial decisions without granting public interest groups
power to prevent an agency from adopting reasonable means to encourage
regulatory compliance. One must recognize at the outset that this limited
empowerment is very different from that envisioned under tripartism be-
cause it would place ultimate control over enforcement in the agency and
thereby constrain interest groups from abusing their power or diverting the
power of the government to further their idiosyncratic ends. For this reason,
the propensity for interest groups to refuse to participate in an ongoing coop-
erative endeavor is not of great importance. Interest groups can play their
traditional role as one-shot objectors to governmental action, but their objec-
tions will not hold sway unless they can convince either the agency or the
court that their position has merits.
The precise mechanism for implementing deliberative participation in
the enforcement context depends on the type of action the agency initially
takes in response to a violation. Generally, the deliberative participation ap-
comes closest to a corporatist system, with unions being given a permanent seat at the bargaining
table. Consistent with my observations that the corporatist structure tends to encourage interest
group leaders to pursue personal objectives, several scholars have noted the tension between
labor leaders' role of representing workers and their incentives to maintain their own power.
See Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1379, 1413
(1988) ("[U]nion managers may have incentives of their own, which conflict with the interests of
the majority: to maintain large membership rolls to enhance their own power and prestige as
leaders of a large organization and maintain or increase union revenues from dues-paying mem-
bers."); Bruce A. Herzfelder & Elizabeth E. Schriever, The Union Judgment Rule, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 980, 980 (1987) ("[U]nion leaders might advance interests of their own rather than interests
of the union's rank and file.").
262 Thus, even in criminal law, where the power of enforcement is thought to lie exclusively
in the state, laws have changed to involve criminal victims more actively in the prosecution and
sanctioning of violators. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice
Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 22 (1999) ("In the fifteen years since the issuance of the [Presi-
dent's Task Force on Victims of Crime] Final Report [in 1982], there has been a literal explosion
of federal and state action to increase crime victim access to and participation in the criminal
justice process. It has largely centered on establishing and interpreting crime victims' rights to
notice of and presence and hearing at critical stages of the criminal justice proceedings.").
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proach would not require major changes to current participatory processes.
It would, however, require substantial revamping of standing law to allow
interest groups to intervene in civil suits brought by the government, and to
bring their own suits to remedy past violations in the face of enforcement
inaction by the government.
Deliberative participation demands that interest groups be able to par-
ticipate as intervenors, with the rights of parties, when the federal govern-
ment brings a civil suit, even when the suit is for a penalty paid to the United
States for purely past prescribed conduct. Currently, private entities would
not have standing to intervene in such a suit unless they could show that the
penalty would deter future violations. Obviously, the courts would have to
relax this standing limitation. If the courts did so, other elements of the law
with respect to intervention would not need to change. Citizen groups that
met standing requirements would be allowed to intervene;263 as parties, these
groups could then engage in discovery, present evidence, and generally pro-
vide a backup to the government enforcement. If the government decided to
settle the case, then deliberative participation would require that the public's
right to comment be extended to settlements involving civil penalties. Inter-
vening interest groups would have to be allowed to comment on the pro-
posed settlement, which would then be subject to judicial review to ensure
that the government did not unreasonably give short shrift to the interests of
the intervenors. 264 In essence, this is only what the law already provides in
cases not involving penalties. Other than changing standing limitations, the
most significant change from existing law would be that the judge would ap-
ply the standard that courts have used to review agency action under the
federal Administrative Procedure Act-the hard look test-rather than sim-
ply rubber stamping agreements between the government and the violator.
Under hard look review,265 a court determines whether an agency con-
sidered all relevant factors and whether an agency developed a rational con-
nection between the evidence in the administrative record and an agency
decision to settle.266 Most importantly, hard look review requires the agency
to explain why it acted as it did 267-in this context, to explain why it chose to
263 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
265 Judge Leventhal explained the doctrine of hard look review in Greater Boston Televi-
sion Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where he wrote:
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case of proce-
dural inadequacies, . . . but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially
from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a "hard
look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making. If the agency has not shirked this fundamental task, however, the court
exercises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would on
its own account have made different findings or adopted different standards.
Id. at 851 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has essentially adopted the "reasoned deci-
sionmaking" approach to judicial review. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).
266 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("Although
this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one.").
267 For discussion of what the hard look doctrine requires, see Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judi-
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settle the case in the face of arguments by intervenors that the settlement was
inappropriate. Federal courts applying this standard of review to environ-
mental enforcement proceedings should evaluate the entire settlement pro-
cess to ensure that the agency has kept itself and intervenors informed about
factual matters, as well as the likelihood that the settlement will cure the
violation and deter future violations. If the court finds that the proposed
consent decree is arbitrary and capricious, it should refrain from imposing its
own solution on the conflict and send the parties off either to try the case or
return to negotiations. By refraining from ruling, the judge avoids transfer-
ring the primary decisionmaking responsibility to the courts.268
If the agency decided to pursue administrative enforcement, deliberative
participation would not demand drastic changes in the procedural mecha-
nisms for involving private interest groups. The most far reaching change
would open the compliance order process to citizen participation. Interest
groups would have to be sufficiently empowered to allow them to seek judi-
cial scrutiny of any final compliance order worked out by the agency and the
violator. A notice-and-comment proceeding with respect to any compliance
order agreed to by the agency and the violator would suffice. An agency
would not have to allow citizen groups to participate on precisely the same
footing as the agency and violator.
If the agency proceeded by formal adjudication, a citizen group's role
would be very similar to its role as an intervenor in a civil action-providing
witnesses, cross-examining other parties' witnesses, and filing briefs. As in
the context of civil suits, intervening groups could not veto any settlements
between the agency and violator, but could subject them to judicial scrutiny.
If the agency proceeded by informal adjudication, citizen group participation
would have to be tailored to avoid forcing the agency to forfeit the flexibility
and cost savings gained by proceeding informally.269 Again, the agency could
comply with such a mandate simply by providing meaningful notice of the
enforcement proceeding and allowing interested citizens groups to file com-
ments regarding their views of appropriate enforcement action. Because
agencies are not limited to hearing cases and controversies, there is no need
cial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric
Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 763, 774 (1994); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 83, 128-29 (1994) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron]; Mark Seidenfeld,
Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 486, 518 n.163 (2002) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing].
268 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron, supra note 267, at 126-27 (discussing po-
tential of the administrative state to implement the "deliberative democratic ideal" of govern-
ment decisionmaking); Seidenfeld, supra note 178, at 1547, 1571 (discussing the role of judicial
review in the administrative state).
269 Arguably, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) already provides a statutory basis for interested persons to
participate in such an informal adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2000) ("[A]n interested
person may appear before an agency or its responsible employees for the presentation, adjust-
ment, or determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a proceeding, whether interlocu-
tory, summary, or otherwise .... "). Although courts have recognized that § 555 applies to
informal adjudications, see, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655
(1990), I am aware of no court that has imposed an obligation on an agency to allow nonparty
interested persons to appear before the agency in an informal adjudication.
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to modify standing law to allow interest groups to participate before the
agency in any of these contexts. Standing law would have to be modified,
however, to allow interest groups to seek judicial review of agency sanctions
with which the group disagreed. Other than changes in standing law, the
major change demanded by deliberative participation is that courts employ
the traditional hard look standard when reviewing agency action, although a
court would have to take into account that an agency has a legitimate interest
in keeping down the costs of informal enforcement proceedings.
Finally, if the agency takes no action at all, deliberative participation
would require that citizens groups be able to force the agency or a court to
address the violation. Thus, the law implementing this approach would have
to allow a citizen to file suit seeking regulatory compliance and penalties to
be paid to the government. Creation of such a broad right to sue would re-
quire a significant change in the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence to
allow Congress to create legal rights in nonconcrete interests that sufficed for
plaintiffs to have standing to sue. Alternatively, Congress might be able to
confer standing on citizen plaintiffs by replacing citizen suits with qui tam
actions, which grant "relators" a right to a portion of fines paid to the govern-
ment upon successful prosecution, because the Supreme Court has held that
relators have a sufficient interest to satisfy Article III standing.270
Citizen suits under the deliberative participation approach would also
require some modest changes in the EPA's authority to take over prosecution
of such suits. Requirements of notice would remain, but, to prevent interest
groups from abusing this power, the agency would be able essentially to take
over prosecution of the violation either by filing its own civil suit or by initiat-
ing an administrative enforcement proceeding prior to the commencement of
the citizen suit.2 71 An interest group would then be able to participate in
these government proceedings as it would had the government initiated the
proceedings without being prompted by the group's notice of intent to file a
citizen suit. The government would be able to stop a citizen suit at any time
but only by moving either for intervention into the proceeding or for a stay in
the case and a determination that the agency should exercise primary juris-
diction.272 Consistent with this approach's focus on deliberation, once a citi-
zen suit was filed, the court in which the suit was pending would demand
from the agency an explanation of why the enforcement proceeding should
be pursued by the government rather than the private citizen group, and the
ultimate decision about whether the citizen suit continues would be left to
the court.
270 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex. rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778
(2000).
271 Currently, once an interest group provides notice of intent to sue, federal or state en-
forcers can stop a citizen suit by commencing a civil prosecution; an administrative proceeding is
not adequate unless begun prior to the interest group's notice of intent. See supra notes 96-100
and accompanying text.
272 Currently the federal and state governments cannot stop a citizen suit from progressing
so long as the suit has already been filed within 120 days of the plaintiffs notice of intent to sue.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
20051
The George Washington Law Review
2. Critiques of Deliberative Participation
Just as the presence of a public interest group at the negotiating table
decreases the likelihood of capture by increasing its coStS, 27 3 judicial review,
in effect, occupies a fourth chair at the table and raises the stakes of capture
and corruption even higher. The use of judicial review as a check on stake-
holder monitoring of the agency is especially useful because it obviates the
need for stakeholders to act cooperatively within the deliberative participa-
tion system of enforcement. Moreover, the insulation of sitting judges from
the political process and the structure of the judiciary as an institution in
which power is distributed between many judges who act independently in
their particular cases makes the prospect of effective capture of the entire
branch unlikely. 274 More significantly, knowledge of judicial review is likely
to alter agency behavior and shape the parties' willingness to listen to minor-
ity voices and comments because the parties know that ultimately the agency
will have to acknowledge those voices to satisfy judicial review; 275 if view-
points are ignored, the ignorance must be justified.
The bane of deliberative participation, however, is the likely cost and
delay it would impose on the enforcement system. Essentially, it relies on a
system of open government and reasoned decisionmaking with a check pro-
vided by judicial review, rather than a system of backroom deals, with partici-
pation as a check on outcomes. As such, it suffers many of the inefficiencies
of the adversarial legal system. 276
For example, justification, especially if it must be supported by a factual
record, makes demands on agency resources. There are means that willing
courts could use to reduce the costs and delays that agencies would have to
bear to meet a reasoned decisionmaking standard. For example, courts could
273 See AYRES & BRArrHWATE, supra note 10, at 71-73.
274 There is considerable debate about the extent to which judges base their decisions on
politics in the sense of ideology. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in
the Administrative State: Lessons from a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 AD-
MIN. L. REv. 45, 98-99 (2001) (arguing that the evidence contradicts an inference that judicial
review of agency action is influenced by political ideology); Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, supra
note 267, at 518-19 nn.167-68 ("The jury is still out on the extent to which judges vote based on
ideology in various contexts."). But see, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Parti-
sanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107
YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998) (arguing that "[p]artisanship clearly affects how appellate courts
review agency discretion"); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1766-67 (1997) (arguing that empirical evidence "support[s]
the theory that D.C. Circuit judges employ a strategically ideological approach to judging"). I
am not aware, however, of anyone contending that judges are susceptible to politics in the sense
of being swayed by lobbying or popular support for a particular ruling.
275 See Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, supra note 267, at 513-14 ("ITihere is good reason to
believe that rulemaking staff at many agencies do worry from the outset about pleasing a court
should the rule be challenged, and therefore do not commit to an outcome before taking such
review into account."); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Pro-
posals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483,
491-92 (1997) (discussing how courts applying hard look review will require the agency to "allow
broad participation in its regulatory process and not disregard the views of any participants").
276 See KAGAN, supra note 261, at 217 (describing the inefficiencies of agencies seeking
information to protect themselves against interest group challenges under a system that demands
comprehensive rationality).
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take into account contentions that costs did not warrant more careful consid-
eration of how the agency should proceed, and assess whether the agency
acted reasonably in deciding whether to pursue compliance in light of the
information it possessed and the cost of better information. Courts would
have to refrain from imposing their own remedies in particular cases, thereby
usurping the role of the parties in reaching an outcome after appropriate
deliberation. Unfortunately, there is no way to give courts discretion under
hard look review and still guarantee that they would abide by these
dictates. 277
In addition, if the agency and interest groups are to act as meaningful
checks on each other, the abilities of interest groups to maintain private en-
forcement suits and agencies to take over enforcement in a large number of
cases filed by interest groups will both have to be expanded. In this time of
political support for less government intervention in the affairs of business
and for lower taxes, it is doubtful that Congress is going to empower interest
groups to bring more suits or give agencies budgets to do so. Given this
political climate, the most likely scenario is one in which Congress continues
to allow citizen suits in limited contexts, and treats such suits as a free means
of enforcing environmental regulation, even as the courts struggle to limit the
influence of interest groups on regulatory prosecutions. In addition, the Su-
preme Court does not seem interested in expanding standing to allow interest
groups to get to court either to obtain judicial review of enforcement deci-
sions or to bring citizen suits.
Conclusion
There is a tension between citizen participation in environmental en-
forcement and an agency's discretion to choose the optimal balance between
deterrence and cooperative approaches to enforcement. Citizen participa-
tion can reduce the costs of monitoring violations and their effects and can
alleviate some of the burden of prosecuting violators. In turn, cooperative
enforcement can reduce monitoring costs by encouraging regulated entities
to provide information on their regulatory performance and can decrease
compliance costs for those entities. Cooperative enforcement can also focus
compliance efforts on violations that cause net harm to the society. To en-
sure that the agency does not abuse the discretion granted to it under this
approach, however, cooperative enforcement itself must be monitored. At
some level, citizen participation threatens to undermine the effective use of
cooperative enforcement. Although citizen participation provides a mecha-
nism for controlling agency abuse under the cooperative enforcement model,
such participation also scares regulated entities by empowering citizens
groups to take unreasonable stands, and hence discourages companies from
self-reporting violations and acting candidly about what it will take to bring
their plants into regulatory compliance.
277 Cf Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59, 61 (1995) (identifying unpredictability of judicial review as one reason why agencies
avoid rulemaking); Seidenfeld, supra note 275, at 492-93 (discussing how the unpredictability of
hard look review "freezes" agency action).
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This Article suggests three approaches to alleviate this tension and
thereby capture the benefits of both citizen participation and a balanced
model of enforcement. The Article shows that although each of these three
approaches-tripartism, corporatism, and deliberative participation-holds
some promise, each also raises significant concerns that prevent it from being
the ideal means of implementing participation in regulatory enforcement.
